Publikation:

Partial Bandwagon Effects and Local Interactions

Lade...
Vorschaubild

Dateien

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

Datum

2007

Autor:innen

Weidenholzer, Simon

Herausgeber:innen

Kontakt

ISSN der Zeitschrift

Electronic ISSN

ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Schriftenreihe

Auflagebezeichnung

ArXiv-ID

Internationale Patentnummer

Angaben zur Forschungsförderung

Projekt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz

Gesperrt bis

Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published

Erschienen in

Games and Economic Behavior. 2007, 61(2), pp. 179-197. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.007

Zusammenfassung

We consider partial bandwagon properties in the context of coordination games to capture the idea of weak network externalities. We then study a local interactions model where agents play a coordination game following a noisy best-reply process. We show that globally pairwise risk dominant strategies are selected in arbitrary 3×3 coordination games, but not necessarily in larger games. A comparison with the global interactions benchmark shows that the nature of interactions might alter the long-run results themselves, and not only the speed of convergence. We also illustrate that the simultaneous coexistence of conventions is possible for games with at least 5 strategies.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Coordination games, Learning, Local interactions, Bandwagon properties, Mutation

Konferenz

Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined

Forschungsvorhaben

Organisationseinheiten

Zeitschriftenheft

Zugehörige Datensätze in KOPS

Zitieren

ISO 690ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Simon WEIDENHOLZER, 2007. Partial Bandwagon Effects and Local Interactions. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2007, 61(2), pp. 179-197. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.007
BibTex
@article{AlosFerrer2007Parti-1796,
  year={2007},
  doi={10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.007},
  title={Partial Bandwagon Effects and Local Interactions},
  number={2},
  volume={61},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  pages={179--197},
  author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon},
  note={Erratum: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.11.001}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/1796">
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T09:35:59Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Alós-Ferrer, Carlos</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Weidenholzer, Simon</dc:creator>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/1796"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:title>Partial Bandwagon Effects and Local Interactions</dcterms:title>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dc:contributor>Weidenholzer, Simon</dc:contributor>
    <dc:contributor>Alós-Ferrer, Carlos</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Games and Economic Behavior ; 61 (2007), 2. - S. 179-197</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T09:35:59Z</dcterms:available>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We consider partial bandwagon properties in the context of coordination games to capture the idea of weak network externalities. We then study a local interactions model where agents play a coordination game following a noisy best-reply process. We show that globally pairwise risk dominant strategies are selected in arbitrary 3×3 coordination games, but not necessarily in larger games. A comparison with the global interactions benchmark shows that the nature of interactions might alter the long-run results themselves, and not only the speed of convergence. We also illustrate that the simultaneous coexistence of conventions is possible for games with at least 5 strategies.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2007</dcterms:issued>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Interner Vermerk

xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter

Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.

Prüfdatum der URL

Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation

Finanzierungsart

Kommentar zur Publikation

Erratum: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.11.001
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen