Publikation: Partial Bandwagon Effects and Local Interactions
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2007
Autor:innen
Weidenholzer, Simon
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Games and Economic Behavior. 2007, 61(2), pp. 179-197. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.007
Zusammenfassung
We consider partial bandwagon properties in the context of coordination games to capture the idea of weak network externalities. We then study a local interactions model where agents play a coordination game following a noisy best-reply process. We show that globally pairwise risk dominant strategies are selected in arbitrary 3×3 coordination games, but not necessarily in larger games. A comparison with the global interactions benchmark shows that the nature of interactions might alter the long-run results themselves, and not only the speed of convergence. We also illustrate that the simultaneous coexistence of conventions is possible for games with at least 5 strategies.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Coordination games, Learning, Local interactions, Bandwagon properties, Mutation
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ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Simon WEIDENHOLZER, 2007. Partial Bandwagon Effects and Local Interactions. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2007, 61(2), pp. 179-197. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.007BibTex
@article{AlosFerrer2007Parti-1796,
year={2007},
doi={10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.007},
title={Partial Bandwagon Effects and Local Interactions},
number={2},
volume={61},
journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
pages={179--197},
author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Weidenholzer, Simon},
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Erratum: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.11.001
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