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Electoral rules, class coalitions and welfare state regimes, or how to explain Esping - Andersen with Stein Rokkan

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2009

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Manow, Philip

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Socio-economic review. 2009, 7(1), pp. 101-121. Available under: doi: 10.1093/ser/mwn022

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It has been recognized since the publication of Esping-Andersen s ThreeWorlds of Welfare Capitalism that the advancedWestern welfare state comes in at least three variants: as a Nordic social-democratic regime, a conservative regime on the European continent or as a liberal welfare state regime in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Why exactly welfare states fit into this three-regime typology remains controversial, however. This article presents an argument which provides the three-regime heuristic with a historical foundation. The argument combines insights into the importance of electoral rules for the representation of socioeconomic interests (of the lower and middle classes) with insights about the different cleavage structures which left their imprint on the party systems of Western Europe. This article s central claim is that a majoritarian electoral system leads to a residual-liberal welfare state, whereas in countries with proportional representation, either a red green coalition between Social Democracy and agrarian parties (Scandinavia) or a red black coalition between Social Democracy and Christian Democracy (on the European continent) was responsible for the build-up of the Nordic and continental welfare state, respectively.

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ISO 690MANOW, Philip, 2009. Electoral rules, class coalitions and welfare state regimes, or how to explain Esping - Andersen with Stein Rokkan. In: Socio-economic review. 2009, 7(1), pp. 101-121. Available under: doi: 10.1093/ser/mwn022
BibTex
@article{Manow2009Elect-2875,
  year={2009},
  doi={10.1093/ser/mwn022},
  title={Electoral rules, class coalitions and welfare state regimes, or how to explain Esping - Andersen with Stein Rokkan},
  number={1},
  volume={7},
  journal={Socio-economic review},
  pages={101--121},
  author={Manow, Philip}
}
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