Publikation: A deeper look at the proportionality-turnout nexus
Dateien
Datum
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
URI (zitierfähiger Link)
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
Internationale Patentnummer
Link zur Lizenz
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Publikationsstatus
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung
Evidence that turnout is higher under proportional representation (PR) than in majoritarian elections is overwhelming. Yet previous research has largely failed to explain why. One line of argument maintains that higher turnout under PR is a by-product of larger party systems. However, a larger number of parties has been demonstrated to depress turnout. Alternatively, it is argued that majoritarian electoral systems tend to produce safe seats and that voters have little incentive to turn out there. Thus, uneven turnout over electoral districts due to variable intensities of local competition is made responsible for the lower overall turnout. Empirical evidence on this conjecture is scant. This article scrutinizes the relationship between electoral rules, competition, and turnout with district-level data from 31 national elections. Results from a heteroscedastic model indicate that lower net turnout in majoritarian systems is indeed a consequence of uneven turnout over districts due to variable levels of local competitiveness.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
Zitieren
ISO 690
SELB, Peter, 2009. A deeper look at the proportionality-turnout nexus. In: Comparative Political Studies. 2009, 42(4), pp. 527-548. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0010414008327427BibTex
@article{Selb2009deepe-4304, year={2009}, doi={10.1177/0010414008327427}, title={A deeper look at the proportionality-turnout nexus}, number={4}, volume={42}, issn={0010-4140}, journal={Comparative Political Studies}, pages={527--548}, author={Selb, Peter} }
RDF
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/4304"> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/> <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format> <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: Comparative Political Studies 42 (2009), 4, pp. 527-548</dcterms:bibliographicCitation> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/4304/1/Selb_a_deeper_look.pdf"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-24T10:13:27Z</dc:date> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/> <dc:contributor>Selb, Peter</dc:contributor> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/4304"/> <dc:creator>Selb, Peter</dc:creator> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/4304/1/Selb_a_deeper_look.pdf"/> <dcterms:title>A deeper look at the proportionality-turnout nexus</dcterms:title> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Evidence that turnout is higher under proportional representation (PR) than in majoritarian elections is overwhelming. Yet previous research has largely failed to explain why. One line of argument maintains that higher turnout under PR is a by-product of larger party systems. However, a larger number of parties has been demonstrated to depress turnout. Alternatively, it is argued that majoritarian electoral systems tend to produce safe seats and that voters have little incentive to turn out there. Thus, uneven turnout over electoral districts due to variable intensities of local competition is made responsible for the lower overall turnout. Empirical evidence on this conjecture is scant. This article scrutinizes the relationship between electoral rules, competition, and turnout with district-level data from 31 national elections. Results from a heteroscedastic model indicate that lower net turnout in majoritarian systems is indeed a consequence of uneven turnout over districts due to variable levels of local competitiveness.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-24T10:13:27Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:issued>2009</dcterms:issued> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>