Publikation:

A deeper look at the proportionality-turnout nexus

Lade...
Vorschaubild

Dateien

Selb_a_deeper_look.pdf
Selb_a_deeper_look.pdfGröße: 2.6 MBDownloads: 656

Datum

2009

Autor:innen

Herausgeber:innen

Kontakt

ISSN der Zeitschrift

Electronic ISSN

ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Schriftenreihe

Auflagebezeichnung

ArXiv-ID

Internationale Patentnummer

Angaben zur Forschungsförderung

Projekt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz

Gesperrt bis

Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published

Erschienen in

Comparative Political Studies. 2009, 42(4), pp. 527-548. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0010414008327427

Zusammenfassung

Evidence that turnout is higher under proportional representation (PR) than in majoritarian elections is overwhelming. Yet previous research has largely failed to explain why. One line of argument maintains that higher turnout under PR is a by-product of larger party systems. However, a larger number of parties has been demonstrated to depress turnout. Alternatively, it is argued that majoritarian electoral systems tend to produce safe seats and that voters have little incentive to turn out there. Thus, uneven turnout over electoral districts due to variable intensities of local competition is made responsible for the lower overall turnout. Empirical evidence on this conjecture is scant. This article scrutinizes the relationship between electoral rules, competition, and turnout with district-level data from 31 national elections. Results from a heteroscedastic model indicate that lower net turnout in majoritarian systems is indeed a consequence of uneven turnout over districts due to variable levels of local competitiveness.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
320 Politik

Schlagwörter

Turnout, Electoral systems, Electoral competition, Proportionality, Electoral districts

Konferenz

Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined

Forschungsvorhaben

Organisationseinheiten

Zeitschriftenheft

Zugehörige Datensätze in KOPS

Zitieren

ISO 690SELB, Peter, 2009. A deeper look at the proportionality-turnout nexus. In: Comparative Political Studies. 2009, 42(4), pp. 527-548. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0010414008327427
BibTex
@article{Selb2009deepe-4304,
  year={2009},
  doi={10.1177/0010414008327427},
  title={A deeper look at the proportionality-turnout nexus},
  number={4},
  volume={42},
  issn={0010-4140},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  pages={527--548},
  author={Selb, Peter}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/4304">
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
    <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: Comparative Political Studies 42 (2009), 4, pp. 527-548</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/4304/1/Selb_a_deeper_look.pdf"/>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-24T10:13:27Z</dc:date>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dc:contributor>Selb, Peter</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/4304"/>
    <dc:creator>Selb, Peter</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/4304/1/Selb_a_deeper_look.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:title>A deeper look at the proportionality-turnout nexus</dcterms:title>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Evidence that turnout is higher under proportional representation (PR) than in majoritarian elections is overwhelming. Yet previous research has largely failed to explain why. One line of argument maintains that higher turnout under PR is a by-product of larger party systems. However, a larger number of parties has been demonstrated to depress turnout. Alternatively, it is argued that majoritarian electoral systems tend to produce safe seats and that voters have little incentive to turn out there. Thus, uneven turnout over electoral districts due to variable intensities of local competition is made responsible for the lower overall turnout. Empirical evidence on this conjecture is scant. This article scrutinizes the relationship between electoral rules, competition, and turnout with district-level data from 31 national elections. Results from a heteroscedastic model indicate that lower net turnout in majoritarian systems is indeed a consequence of uneven turnout over districts due to variable levels of local competitiveness.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-24T10:13:27Z</dcterms:available>
    <dcterms:issued>2009</dcterms:issued>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Interner Vermerk

xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter

Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.

Prüfdatum der URL

Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation

Finanzierungsart

Kommentar zur Publikation

Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen