Publikation:

Inflation Forecast Contracts

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Datum

2012

Autor:innen

Gersbach, Hans

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Centre for Economic Policy Research cepr / Discussion paper series;8933

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-215946
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Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Publikationen
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Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

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Working Paper/Technical Report
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Zusammenfassung

We introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers: inflation forecast contracts, which make central bankers’ remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts. We show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more effectively, thus facilitating more successful stabilization of current inflation. Inflation forecast contracts improve the accuracy of inflation forecasts, but have adverse consequences for output. On balance, paying central bankers according to their forecasting performance improves welfare. Optimal inflation forecast contracts stipulate high rewards for accurate forecasts.

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Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

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ISO 690GERSBACH, Hans, Volker HAHN, 2012. Inflation Forecast Contracts
BibTex
@techreport{Gersbach2012Infla-21594,
  year={2012},
  series={Centre for Economic Policy Research cepr / Discussion paper series;8933},
  title={Inflation Forecast Contracts},
  author={Gersbach, Hans and Hahn, Volker},
  note={Link zur Originalveröffentlichung: http://www.cer.ethz.ch/research/WP-11-149.pdf}
}
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    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers: inflation forecast contracts, which make central bankers’ remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts. We show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more effectively, thus facilitating more successful stabilization of current inflation. Inflation forecast contracts improve the accuracy of inflation forecasts, but have adverse consequences for output. On balance, paying central bankers according to their forecasting performance improves welfare. Optimal inflation forecast contracts stipulate high rewards for accurate forecasts.</dcterms:abstract>
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Link zur Originalveröffentlichung: http://www.cer.ethz.ch/research/WP-11-149.pdf
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