Investments as Signals of Outside Options

Goldlücke, Susanne; Schmitz, Patrick W.

Investments as Signals of Outside Options

Dateien

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Datum

2014

Autor:innen

Goldlücke, Susanne

Schmitz, Patrick W.

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

unikn.publication.listelement.citation.prefix.version.undefined

Journal of Economic Theory. 2014, 150, pp. 683-708. ISSN 0022-0531. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.001

Zusammenfassung

Consider a seller who can make an observable but non-contractible investment to improve an intermediate good that is specialized to a particular buyerʼs needs. The buyer then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. The seller has private information about the fraction of the ex post surplus that he can realize on his own. Compared to a situation with complete information, additional investment incentives are generated by the sellerʼs desire to pretend a strong outside option. On the other hand, ex post efficiency is not attained since asymmetric information at the bargaining stage sometimes leads to inefficient separations.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Incomplete contracts, Relationship-specific investments, Hold-up problem, Signaling games

Zitieren

ISO 690

GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Patrick W. SCHMITZ, 2014. Investments as Signals of Outside Options. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2014, 150, pp. 683-708. ISSN 0022-0531. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.001

BibTex

@article{Goldlucke2014Inves-28566,
  year={2014},
  doi={10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.001},
  title={Investments as Signals of Outside Options},
  volume={150},
  issn={0022-0531},
  journal={Journal of Economic Theory},
  pages={683--708},
  author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W.}
}

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