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Central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem

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2013

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Pichler, Paul
Sorger, Gerhard

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https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12027
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International Economic Review. Wiley. 2013, 54(3), pp. 1031-1055. ISSN 0020-6598. eISSN 1468-2354. Available under: doi: 10.1111/iere.12027

Zusammenfassung

We study the monetary instrument problem in a dynamic noncooperative game between separate, discretionary, fiscal and monetary policy makers. We show that monetary instruments are equivalent only if the policy makers' objectives are perfectly aligned; otherwise an instrument problem exists. When the central bank is benevolent while the fiscal authority is short‐sighted relative to the private sector, excessive public spending and debt emerge under a money growth policy but not under an interest rate policy. Despite this property, the interest rate is not necessarily the optimal instrument.

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ISO 690NIEMANN, Stefan, Paul PICHLER, Gerhard SORGER, 2013. Central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem. In: International Economic Review. Wiley. 2013, 54(3), pp. 1031-1055. ISSN 0020-6598. eISSN 1468-2354. Available under: doi: 10.1111/iere.12027
BibTex
@article{Niemann2013-08Centr-49439,
  year={2013},
  doi={10.1111/iere.12027},
  title={Central bank independence and the monetary instrument problem},
  number={3},
  volume={54},
  issn={0020-6598},
  journal={International Economic Review},
  pages={1031--1055},
  author={Niemann, Stefan and Pichler, Paul and Sorger, Gerhard}
}
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