Publikation: Best-response dynamics in a birth-death model of evolution in games
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2010
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Neustadt, Ilja
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International Game Theory Review. 2010, 12(2), pp. 197-204. Available under: doi: 10.1142/S021919891000260X
Zusammenfassung
We consider a model of evolution with mutations as in Kandori et al. (1993) [Kandori, M., Mailath, G.J., Rob, R., 1993. Learning, mutation, and long run equilibria in games. Econometrica 61, 29 56], where agents follow best-response decision rules as in Sandholm (1998) [Sandholm, W., 1998. Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution. Economics Letters 61, 165 170]. Contrary to those papers, our model gives rise to a birth-death process, which allows explicit computation of the long-run probabilities of equilibria for given values of the mutation rate and the population size. We use this fact to provide a direct proof of the stochastic stability of risk-dominant equilibria as the mutation rate tends to zero, and illustrate the outcomes of the dynamics for positive mutation rates.
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Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
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Coordination games, learning, mutation, birth-death processes
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ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Ilja NEUSTADT, 2010. Best-response dynamics in a birth-death model of evolution in games. In: International Game Theory Review. 2010, 12(2), pp. 197-204. Available under: doi: 10.1142/S021919891000260XBibTex
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title={Best-response dynamics in a birth-death model of evolution in games},
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journal={International Game Theory Review},
pages={197--204},
author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Neustadt, Ilja}
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