Team reasoning without a hive mind

Radzvilas, Mantas; Karpus, Jurgis

Team reasoning without a hive mind

Dateien

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

Datum

2021

Autor:innen

Radzvilas, Mantas

Karpus, Jurgis

DOI (zitierfähiger Link)

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2021.09.003

Sammlungen

Philosophie

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Research in Economics. Elsevier. 2021, 75(4), pp. 345-353. ISSN 1090-9443. eISSN 1090-9451. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.rie.2021.09.003

Zusammenfassung

The theory of team reasoning has been developed to resolve a long-lasting niggle in orthodox game theory. Despite its intuitive appeal, the theory has received little attention from mainstream game theorists and economists to date. We believe that this is so because of two theoretic issues, which the theory of team reasoning itself needs to resolve. One of these presents a worry that the theory achieves its explanatory and predictive success by abandoning ontological individualism — a fundamental precept in mainstream economics, including game theory. Here we argue that the theory of team reasoning is compatible with ontological individualism. We show that the core principles of the theory — those that give rise to the above worry — are in fact implicitly assumed in some branches of orthodox game theory itself. We also argue against the methodological approach that construes team reasoning as involving a transformation of the interacting players’ payoffs in modelled games.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

100 Philosophie

Schlagwörter

Team reasoning, Collective agency, Agency transformation, Ontological individualism, Game theory, Payoff dominance

Zitieren

ISO 690

RADZVILAS, Mantas, Jurgis KARPUS, 2021. Team reasoning without a hive mind. In: Research in Economics. Elsevier. 2021, 75(4), pp. 345-353. ISSN 1090-9443. eISSN 1090-9451. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.rie.2021.09.003

BibTex

@article{Radzvilas2021reaso-57876,
  year={2021},
  doi={10.1016/j.rie.2021.09.003},
  title={Team reasoning without a hive mind},
  number={4},
  volume={75},
  issn={1090-9443},
  journal={Research in Economics},
  pages={345--353},
  author={Radzvilas, Mantas and Karpus, Jurgis}
}

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