Publikation: Team reasoning without a hive mind
Dateien
Datum
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Sammlungen
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Publikationsstatus
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung
The theory of team reasoning has been developed to resolve a long-lasting niggle in orthodox game theory. Despite its intuitive appeal, the theory has received little attention from mainstream game theorists and economists to date. We believe that this is so because of two theoretic issues, which the theory of team reasoning itself needs to resolve. One of these presents a worry that the theory achieves its explanatory and predictive success by abandoning ontological individualism — a fundamental precept in mainstream economics, including game theory. Here we argue that the theory of team reasoning is compatible with ontological individualism. We show that the core principles of the theory — those that give rise to the above worry — are in fact implicitly assumed in some branches of orthodox game theory itself. We also argue against the methodological approach that construes team reasoning as involving a transformation of the interacting players’ payoffs in modelled games.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
Zitieren
ISO 690
RADZVILAS, Mantas, Jurgis KARPUS, 2021. Team reasoning without a hive mind. In: Research in Economics. Elsevier. 2021, 75(4), pp. 345-353. ISSN 1090-9443. eISSN 1090-9451. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.rie.2021.09.003BibTex
@article{Radzvilas2021reaso-57876, year={2021}, doi={10.1016/j.rie.2021.09.003}, title={Team reasoning without a hive mind}, number={4}, volume={75}, issn={1090-9443}, journal={Research in Economics}, pages={345--353}, author={Radzvilas, Mantas and Karpus, Jurgis} }
RDF
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/57876"> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/40"/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/57876"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2022-06-30T07:57:09Z</dc:date> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dc:contributor>Karpus, Jurgis</dc:contributor> <dcterms:issued>2021</dcterms:issued> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:contributor>Radzvilas, Mantas</dc:contributor> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2022-06-30T07:57:09Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/40"/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">The theory of team reasoning has been developed to resolve a long-lasting niggle in orthodox game theory. Despite its intuitive appeal, the theory has received little attention from mainstream game theorists and economists to date. We believe that this is so because of two theoretic issues, which the theory of team reasoning itself needs to resolve. One of these presents a worry that the theory achieves its explanatory and predictive success by abandoning ontological individualism — a fundamental precept in mainstream economics, including game theory. Here we argue that the theory of team reasoning is compatible with ontological individualism. We show that the core principles of the theory — those that give rise to the above worry — are in fact implicitly assumed in some branches of orthodox game theory itself. We also argue against the methodological approach that construes team reasoning as involving a transformation of the interacting players’ payoffs in modelled games.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:creator>Karpus, Jurgis</dc:creator> <dc:creator>Radzvilas, Mantas</dc:creator> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <dcterms:title>Team reasoning without a hive mind</dcterms:title> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>