Publikation:

Principal-Agent and Peer Relationships in Tournaments

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Eisenkopf_0-274779.pdf
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Datum

2013

Autor:innen

Teyssier, Sabrina

Herausgeber:innen

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-274779
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Open Access Green

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Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

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Working Paper/Technical Report
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Published

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Zusammenfassung

Social preferences explain competitive behavior between agents and reciprocity towards a principal but there is no insight into the interaction of competition and reciprocity. We conducted a laboratory experiment with two treatments to address this issue. In a conventional tournament, an agent receives either the full prize or no prize at all. The other treatment provides the same incentives but the actual payment of an agent equals her expected payment. In both treatments the principal chooses between a low and a high guaranteed payment. Standard economic theory predicts the same effort provision in all situations. Our results show that inequity between agents’ payoffs and generosity of the principal determines the effectiveness of tournaments. Moreover, the data reveal that agents focus their preferences either on the principal or on the agent.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Tournament, Envy, Inequity, Agency problem

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ISO 690EISENKOPF, Gerald, Sabrina TEYSSIER, 2013. Principal-Agent and Peer Relationships in Tournaments
BibTex
@techreport{Eisenkopf2013Princ-29933,
  year={2013},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={Principal-Agent and Peer Relationships in Tournaments},
  number={2013-07},
  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald and Teyssier, Sabrina}
}
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