Publikation: Expectations about coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representation
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In this paper, I suggest that voters may act strategically in proportional representation elections with post-election coalition building. Based on a stylized setup involving three possible coalitions of four parties on a single policy dimension, voters whose preferred coalition is least likely to win are predicted to strategically cast their ballot for a centrist party. By contrast, those who perceive a chance for their preferred coalition to become the next government are predicted to strategically vote for a non-centrist party. I test these predictions against the standard model of sincere proximity voting, using a unique dataset on voter expectations in the Austrian parliamentary election 2006. Analyses show that believing one’s preferred coalition is non-viable raises the probability of voting for a centrist vs. non-centrist party while believing one’s preferred coalition to be viable lowers the probability of voting for a centrist vs. non-centrist party.
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HERRMANN, Michael, 2008. Expectations about coalitions and strategic voting under proportional representationBibTex
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year={2008},
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<dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">In this paper, I suggest that voters may act strategically in proportional representation elections with post-election coalition building. Based on a stylized setup involving three possible coalitions of four parties on a single policy dimension, voters whose preferred coalition is least likely to win are predicted to strategically cast their ballot for a centrist party. By contrast, those who perceive a chance for their preferred coalition to become the next government are predicted to strategically vote for a non-centrist party. I test these predictions against the standard model of sincere proximity voting, using a unique dataset on voter expectations in the Austrian parliamentary election 2006. Analyses show that believing one’s preferred coalition is non-viable raises the probability of voting for a centrist vs. non-centrist party while believing one’s preferred coalition to be viable lowers the probability of voting for a centrist vs. non-centrist party.</dcterms:abstract>
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