Publikation: The Intentional versus the Propositional Structure of Contents
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The paper argues that the objects of belief should not be conceived as sets of possible worlds or propositions of set of centered possible worlds or egocentric propositions (this is the propositional conception), but rather as sets of pairs consisting of a centered world and a sequence of objects (this is the intentional conception of the objects of belief). The paper explains the deep significance of this thesis for the framework of two-dimensional semantics, indeed for any framework trying to adequately relate semantics and epistemology (which is here construed as what I call the Congruence Principle). I give three arguments for this thesis, two preliminary indecisive ones by way of examples, and third theoretical one alluding to a deep principle of philosophical psychology (which I call the Invariance Principle). This paper is an improved and up-dated version of my paper No. 25. It will appear in Causation, Coherence, and Concepts. A Collection of Essays of mine.
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SPOHN, Wolfgang, 2008. The Intentional versus the Propositional Structure of Contents. In: SPOHN, Wolfgang, ed.. Causation, Coherence and Concepts : A Collection of Essays. Dordrecht: Springer, 2008, pp. 335-359. ISBN 978-94-007-8705-6. Available under: doi: 10.1007/978-1-4020-5474-7_16BibTex
@incollection{Spohn2008Inten-3428, year={2008}, doi={10.1007/978-1-4020-5474-7_16}, title={The Intentional versus the Propositional Structure of Contents}, isbn={978-94-007-8705-6}, publisher={Springer}, address={Dordrecht}, booktitle={Causation, Coherence and Concepts : A Collection of Essays}, pages={335--359}, editor={Spohn, Wolfgang}, author={Spohn, Wolfgang} }
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