Publikation:

Managerial optimism and investment choice

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Englmaier.pdf
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2010

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Managerial and Decision Economics. 2010, 31(4), pp. 303-310. ISSN 0143-6570. Available under: doi: 10.1002/mde.1498

Zusammenfassung

This paper analyzes whether it might be desirable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain R&D strategy. I consider a Cournot model with an ex-ante R&D stage where firms can invest in cost reduction before product market competition takes place. I show that firms want to hire overoptimistic managers and argue that a manager's type may serve as a substitute for strategic delegation via contracts.

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330 Wirtschaft

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ISO 690ENGLMAIER, Florian, 2010. Managerial optimism and investment choice. In: Managerial and Decision Economics. 2010, 31(4), pp. 303-310. ISSN 0143-6570. Available under: doi: 10.1002/mde.1498
BibTex
@article{Englmaier2010Manag-12707,
  year={2010},
  doi={10.1002/mde.1498},
  title={Managerial optimism and investment choice},
  number={4},
  volume={31},
  issn={0143-6570},
  journal={Managerial and Decision Economics},
  pages={303--310},
  author={Englmaier, Florian}
}
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