Publikation: The Illusion of 'Peace Through Power-Sharing' : Constitutional Choice in the Shadow of Civil War
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Conflict managers around the world cling to the hope that power-sharing decreases the risk of civil war in post-conflict societies. Distinguishing between territorial and governmental conflicts, we analyse the origin and effectiveness of power-sharing institutions (PSI) and power-sharing arrangements (PSA). Our examination reveals that power-sharing is largely a consequence of the institutional legacy and of the war outcome. While PSI such as proportional representation or federalism cannot prevent a war from recurring, PSA in the form of grand coalitions reduces this risk marginally. However, granting autonomy to a rebellious region increases the danger that the relationship with the government turns violent again. Our results suggest that constitution makers should advocate power-sharing with caution.
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POSPIESZNA, Paulina, Gerald SCHNEIDER, 2013. The Illusion of 'Peace Through Power-Sharing' : Constitutional Choice in the Shadow of Civil War. In: Civil Wars. 2013, 15(sup1), pp. 44-70. ISSN 1369-8249. eISSN 1743-968X. Available under: doi: 10.1080/13698249.2013.850877BibTex
@article{Pospieszna2013Illus-25541, year={2013}, doi={10.1080/13698249.2013.850877}, title={The Illusion of 'Peace Through Power-Sharing' : Constitutional Choice in the Shadow of Civil War}, number={sup1}, volume={15}, issn={1369-8249}, journal={Civil Wars}, pages={44--70}, author={Pospieszna, Paulina and Schneider, Gerald} }
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