Publikation: Restraining free-riders : The effects of actor types and decision rules in the public goods game
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Many experiments comparing individual and group behavior find that groups behave more egoistically than individuals. However, most of these studies do not control for the influence of within-group decision-making rules that might have an important impact on group behavior. In this article, we report findings from laboratory experiments comparing individual and group behavior in a public goods game. We find that rather than cooperation levels differing between individuals and groups per se, the intragroup decision-making rule has an influence on the cooperativeness of groups. Groups decide either by majority or unanimity rule. While groups deciding by majority rule reach roughly the same level of cooperation as individuals, groups deciding by unanimity rule contribute significantly lower amounts to the public good.
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SAUERMANN, Jan, Ulrich GLASSMANN, 2014. Restraining free-riders : The effects of actor types and decision rules in the public goods game. In: Rationality and Society. 2014, 26(3), pp. 290-319. ISSN 1043-4631. eISSN 1461-7358. Available under: doi: 10.1177/1043463114533073BibTex
@article{Sauermann2014Restr-29690, year={2014}, doi={10.1177/1043463114533073}, title={Restraining free-riders : The effects of actor types and decision rules in the public goods game}, number={3}, volume={26}, issn={1043-4631}, journal={Rationality and Society}, pages={290--319}, author={Sauermann, Jan and Glassmann, Ulrich} }
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