Publikation:

When Technocratic Appointments Signal Credibility

Lade...
Vorschaubild

Dateien

Alexiadou_2-1tdargcxhm0qb7.pdf
Alexiadou_2-1tdargcxhm0qb7.pdfGröße: 862.83 KBDownloads: 86

Datum

2022

Autor:innen

Alexiadou, Despina
Spaniel, William

Herausgeber:innen

Kontakt

ISSN der Zeitschrift

Electronic ISSN

ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Schriftenreihe

Auflagebezeichnung

ArXiv-ID

Internationale Patentnummer

Link zur Lizenz

Angaben zur Forschungsförderung

Projekt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Hybrid
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz

Gesperrt bis

Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published

Erschienen in

Comparative Political Studies. Sage Publications. 2022, 55(3), pp. 386-419. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/00104140211024288

Zusammenfassung

How do prime ministers manage investors’ expectations during financial crises? We take a novel approach to this question by investigating ministerial appointments. When prime ministers appoint technocrats, defined as non-partisan experts, they forgo political benefits and can credibly signal their willingness to pay down their debt obligations. This reduces bond yields, but only at times when the market is sensitive to expected repayments—that is, during crises. To examine the theory, we develop an event study analysis that employs new data on the background of finance ministers in 21 Western and Eastern European democracies. We find that investors reward technocratic appointments by reducing a country’s borrowing costs. Consistent with the theory, technocratic appointments under crises predict lower bond yields. Our findings contribute to the literature on the interplay of financial markets and domestic politics.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
320 Politik

Schlagwörter

technocrats, experts, financial crises, credible policy signals, financial markets

Konferenz

Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined

Forschungsvorhaben

Organisationseinheiten

Zeitschriftenheft

Zugehörige Datensätze in KOPS

Zitieren

ISO 690ALEXIADOU, Despina, William SPANIEL, Hakan GUNAYDIN, 2022. When Technocratic Appointments Signal Credibility. In: Comparative Political Studies. Sage Publications. 2022, 55(3), pp. 386-419. ISSN 0010-4140. eISSN 1552-3829. Available under: doi: 10.1177/00104140211024288
BibTex
@article{Alexiadou2022-03Techn-54570,
  year={2022},
  doi={10.1177/00104140211024288},
  title={When Technocratic Appointments Signal Credibility},
  number={3},
  volume={55},
  issn={0010-4140},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  pages={386--419},
  author={Alexiadou, Despina and Spaniel, William and Gunaydin, Hakan}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/54570">
    <dc:creator>Gunaydin, Hakan</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:issued>2022-03</dcterms:issued>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dc:contributor>Alexiadou, Despina</dc:contributor>
    <dc:rights>Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International</dc:rights>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">How do prime ministers manage investors’ expectations during financial crises? We take a novel approach to this question by investigating ministerial appointments. When prime ministers appoint technocrats, defined as non-partisan experts, they forgo political benefits and can credibly signal their willingness to pay down their debt obligations. This reduces bond yields, but only at times when the market is sensitive to expected repayments—that is, during crises. To examine the theory, we develop an event study analysis that employs new data on the background of finance ministers in 21 Western and Eastern European democracies. We find that investors reward technocratic appointments by reducing a country’s borrowing costs. Consistent with the theory, technocratic appointments under crises predict lower bond yields. Our findings contribute to the literature on the interplay of financial markets and domestic politics.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"/>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/54570/1/Alexiadou_2-1tdargcxhm0qb7.pdf"/>
    <dc:contributor>Gunaydin, Hakan</dc:contributor>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2021-08-13T10:56:41Z</dc:date>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/54570"/>
    <dc:creator>Spaniel, William</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dc:contributor>Spaniel, William</dc:contributor>
    <dc:creator>Alexiadou, Despina</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2021-08-13T10:56:41Z</dcterms:available>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:title>When Technocratic Appointments Signal Credibility</dcterms:title>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/54570/1/Alexiadou_2-1tdargcxhm0qb7.pdf"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Interner Vermerk

xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter

Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.

Prüfdatum der URL

Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation

Finanzierungsart

Kommentar zur Publikation

Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Nein
Begutachtet
Ja
Diese Publikation teilen