Reasons for Conflict : Lessons from Bargaining Experiments

dc.contributor.authorFalk, Armin
dc.contributor.authorFehr, Ernst
dc.contributor.authorFischbacher, Urs
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-05T07:18:06Z
dc.date.available2017-09-05T07:18:06Z
dc.date.issued2003-03-01eng
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we experimentally study the effects of fairness, spite, and reputation formation on conflict. We show that fairness preferences are a potential source of conflict and that intentions play an important role in the perception of fairness. Further, we show that feelings of spite may affect the occurrence of conflict. Finally, we study reputation formation as a possible source of conflict. We show that people invest in a reputation of being a tough bargainer. This does not automatically increase conflict, however. The reason is that through reputation, information about one's opponent is much better than in anonymous bargaining.eng
dc.description.versionpublishedeng
dc.identifier.doi10.1628/0932456032974925eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/39974
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.subject.ddc330eng
dc.titleReasons for Conflict : Lessons from Bargaining Experimentseng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEeng
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.citation.bibtex
@article{Falk2003-03-01Reaso-39974,
  year={2003},
  doi={10.1628/0932456032974925},
  title={Reasons for Conflict : Lessons from Bargaining Experiments},
  number={1},
  volume={159},
  issn={0932-4569},
  journal={Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics : JITE},
  pages={171--187},
  author={Falk, Armin and Fehr, Ernst and Fischbacher, Urs}
}
kops.citation.iso690FALK, Armin, Ernst FEHR, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2003. Reasons for Conflict : Lessons from Bargaining Experiments. In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics : JITE. 2003, 159(1), pp. 171-187. ISSN 0932-4569. eISSN 1614-0559. Available under: doi: 10.1628/0932456032974925deu
kops.citation.iso690FALK, Armin, Ernst FEHR, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2003. Reasons for Conflict : Lessons from Bargaining Experiments. In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics : JITE. 2003, 159(1), pp. 171-187. ISSN 0932-4569. eISSN 1614-0559. Available under: doi: 10.1628/0932456032974925eng
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kops.sourcefieldJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics : JITE. 2003, <b>159</b>(1), pp. 171-187. ISSN 0932-4569. eISSN 1614-0559. Available under: doi: 10.1628/0932456032974925deu
kops.sourcefield.plainJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics : JITE. 2003, 159(1), pp. 171-187. ISSN 0932-4569. eISSN 1614-0559. Available under: doi: 10.1628/0932456032974925deu
kops.sourcefield.plainJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics : JITE. 2003, 159(1), pp. 171-187. ISSN 0932-4569. eISSN 1614-0559. Available under: doi: 10.1628/0932456032974925eng
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