Horizontal and vertical social preferences in tournaments

Eisenkopf, Gerald; Teyssier, Sabrina

Horizontal and vertical social preferences in tournaments

Dateien

TWI_RPS_048_Eisenkopf_Teyssier_2009_10.pdfGröße: 712.92 KBDownloads: 179

Datum

2009

Autor:innen

Eisenkopf, Gerald

Teyssier, Sabrina

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

Most studies find no collusion in tournaments. This result suggests that social preferences are irrelevant in this context. We investigate the impact of social preferences in a tournament using data from a laboratory experiment with two treatments. In a conventional tournament, an agent receives either the full prize or no prize at all. The other tournament provides the same incentives but the actual payment of an agent equals her expected payment. In both treatments the principal chooses between a fair and an unfair contract. Standard economic theory predicts the same effort provision in all situations. Our results show instead that envy between agents and the fairness of the principal determine the effectiveness of tournaments. Moreover, we observe that collusion between the agents and reciprocity towards the principal are mutually exclusive.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

tournament, collusion, envy, agency problem, reciprocity

Zitieren

ISO 690

EISENKOPF, Gerald, Sabrina TEYSSIER, 2009. Horizontal and vertical social preferences in tournaments

BibTex

@techreport{Eisenkopf2009Horiz-12063,
  year={2009},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={Horizontal and vertical social preferences in tournaments},
  number={48},
  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald and Teyssier, Sabrina}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

Ja