Publikation:

Horizontal and vertical social preferences in tournaments

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TWI_RPS_048_Eisenkopf_Teyssier_2009_10.pdf
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Datum

2009

Autor:innen

Teyssier, Sabrina

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-109854
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Open Access Green

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Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Publikationen
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Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

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Working Paper/Technical Report
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Published

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Zusammenfassung

Most studies find no collusion in tournaments. This result suggests that social preferences are irrelevant in this context. We investigate the impact of social preferences in a tournament using data from a laboratory experiment with two treatments. In a conventional tournament, an agent receives either the full prize or no prize at all. The other tournament provides the same incentives but the actual payment of an agent equals her expected payment. In both treatments the principal chooses between a fair and an unfair contract. Standard economic theory predicts the same effort provision in all situations. Our results show instead that envy between agents and the fairness of the principal determine the effectiveness of tournaments. Moreover, we observe that collusion between the agents and reciprocity towards the principal are mutually exclusive.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

tournament, collusion, envy, agency problem, reciprocity

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ISO 690EISENKOPF, Gerald, Sabrina TEYSSIER, 2009. Horizontal and vertical social preferences in tournaments
BibTex
@techreport{Eisenkopf2009Horiz-12063,
  year={2009},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={Horizontal and vertical social preferences in tournaments},
  number={48},
  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald and Teyssier, Sabrina}
}
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