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Hume on Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Suspension of Judgement

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2025

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Stapleford, Scott

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STAPLEFORD, Scott, Hrsg., Verena WAGNER, Hrsg.. Hume and Contemporary Epistemology. New York: Routledge, 2025, S. 49-71. ISBN 978-1-032-49502-6. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.4324/9781003394129-6

Zusammenfassung

This chapter examines Hume’s understanding of a third doxastic position distinct from belief and disbelief, arguing that his epistemology presupposes different forms of doxastic neutrality. While Hume does not explicitly discuss this third position, his Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding offer ideas relevant to contemporary debates on suspension of judgement and inquiry. Hume engaged with Pyrrhonian scepticism, finding its suspension of judgement excessive, yet acknowledging that the Pyrrhonian arguments are theoretically difficult to refute. Based on various interpretations of Hume’s critique of Pyrrhonian ideas, we discuss the relevance of his thoughts on suspension of judgement and inquiry through the lens of modern epistemological discussions.

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100 Philosophie

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ISO 690WAGNER, Verena, Scott STAPLEFORD, 2025. Hume on Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Suspension of Judgement. In: STAPLEFORD, Scott, Hrsg., Verena WAGNER, Hrsg.. Hume and Contemporary Epistemology. New York: Routledge, 2025, S. 49-71. ISBN 978-1-032-49502-6. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.4324/9781003394129-6
BibTex
@incollection{Wagner2025Pyrrh-71767,
  year={2025},
  doi={10.4324/9781003394129-6},
  title={Hume on Pyrrhonian Scepticism and Suspension of Judgement},
  isbn={978-1-032-49502-6},
  publisher={Routledge},
  address={New York},
  booktitle={Hume and Contemporary Epistemology},
  pages={49--71},
  editor={Stapleford, Scott and Wagner, Verena},
  author={Wagner, Verena and Stapleford, Scott}
}
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