Publikation: International Repercussions of Direct Taxes
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This paper analyzes the impact of tax competition between two countries of un- equal per-capita capital endowments on tax rates and efficiency when distorting wage, residence-based and source-based capital taxes (o any combination of two instruments) are available for governments. The national welfare costs and benefits of tax rate varia- tions are shown to be ambiguous in the asymmetric Nash equilibrium due to the existence of tax base and terms of trade effects. Moreover,numerical simulation results indicate that non-cooperative equilibria in Nash strategies are inefficient from an international perspective, even if residence-based capital taxes are in the set of tax instruments avail- able to fiscal authorities.
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EGGERT, Wolfgang, 1999. International Repercussions of Direct TaxesBibTex
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year={1999},
series={CoFE-Diskussionspapiere / Zentrum für Finanzen und Ökonometrie},
title={International Repercussions of Direct Taxes},
number={1999/02},
author={Eggert, Wolfgang}
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