International Repercussions of Direct Taxes

Eggert, Wolfgang

International Repercussions of Direct Taxes

Dateien

320_1.pdfGröße: 224.49 KBDownloads: 259

Datum

1999

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

This paper analyzes the impact of tax competition between two countries of un- equal per-capita capital endowments on tax rates and efficiency when distorting wage, residence-based and source-based capital taxes (o any combination of two instruments) are available for governments. The national welfare costs and benefits of tax rate varia- tions are shown to be ambiguous in the asymmetric Nash equilibrium due to the existence of tax base and terms of trade effects. Moreover,numerical simulation results indicate that non-cooperative equilibria in Nash strategies are inefficient from an international perspective, even if residence-based capital taxes are in the set of tax instruments avail- able to fiscal authorities.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Zitieren

ISO 690

EGGERT, Wolfgang, 1999. International Repercussions of Direct Taxes

BibTex

@techreport{Eggert1999Inter-11902,
  year={1999},
  series={CoFE-Diskussionspapiere / Zentrum für Finanzen und Ökonometrie},
  title={International Repercussions of Direct Taxes},
  number={1999/02},
  author={Eggert, Wolfgang}
}

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