Publikation: Envy and loss aversion in tournaments
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In tournaments, the large variance in effort provision is incompatible with standard economic theory. In our experiment we test theoretical predictions about the role of envy and loss aversion in tournaments. Our results confirm that envy implies higher effort while loss aversion increases the variance of effort. Moreover, we show that standard theory provides a good explanation for competitive behavior when envy and loss aversion do not play a role in the decision making process.Tournaments require a large gap in prizes in order to induce incentives. The resulting unequal distribution suggests that monetary payoffs are not the only motive that determines agents’ decisions. In our experiment we test theoretical predictions about the role of envy and loss aversion in tournaments. Our results confirm that the limitation of inequity between subjects’ payments implies lower effort while the elimination of losses relative to expectations decreases the variance of effort. They suggest that envy and loss aversion drive behavior in tournaments. Moreover, we show that standard theory provides a good explanation for competitive behavior when envy and loss aversion do not play a role in the decision making process.
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EISENKOPF, Gerald, Sabrina TEYSSIER, 2013. Envy and loss aversion in tournaments. In: Journal of Economic Psychology. 2013, 34, pp. 240-255. ISSN 0167-4870. eISSN 1872-7719. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2012.06.006BibTex
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doi={10.1016/j.joep.2012.06.006},
title={Envy and loss aversion in tournaments},
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author={Eisenkopf, Gerald and Teyssier, Sabrina}
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