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Minimum Wages and Welfare in a Hotelling Duopsony

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2008

Autor:innen

Madden, Paul

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-94431
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0412-2
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Published

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IZA Discussion Papers No. 2008, 3434, pp. 1-46. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-008-0412-2

Zusammenfassung

Two firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0,1] prior to announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed; the (constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage location-wage game are studied under laissez-faire and under a minimum wage regime. Up to a restriction for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, the imposition of a minimum wage is always welfare-improving because of its effect on non-wage job characteristics.

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Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

duopsony, minimum wages, hotelling

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ISO 690KAAS, Leo, Paul MADDEN, 2008. Minimum Wages and Welfare in a Hotelling Duopsony. In: IZA Discussion Papers No. 2008, 3434, pp. 1-46. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-008-0412-2
BibTex
@article{Kaas2008Minim-1902,
  year={2008},
  doi={10.1007/s00199-008-0412-2},
  title={Minimum Wages and Welfare in a Hotelling Duopsony},
  volume={3434},
  journal={IZA Discussion Papers No},
  pages={1--46},
  author={Kaas, Leo and Madden, Paul}
}
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