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Tax Rules

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2012

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Gersbach, Hans
Imhof, Stephan

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-246277
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https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0675-1
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Social Choice and Welfare. 2012, 41(1), pp. 19-42. ISSN 0176-1714. eISSN 1432-217X. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00355-012-0675-1

Zusammenfassung

Tax schemes are more restricted by constitutional rules than subsidies. We introduce a model of public good provision with incentive problems in agenda-setting and identify several advantages of restrictions on tax schemes. In particular, tax rules may prevent the proposal and adoption of inefficient projects that benefit only a small minority. We also propose “redistribution efficiency” as a socially desirable property of proposals and find that tax rules guarantee this kind of efficiency. Moreover, a constitution that requires certain restrictions on both taxes and subsidies satisfies a criterion we label “robustness against counter-proposals.” We provide an axiomatic characterization of this constitution. Finally, we perform utilitarian welfare comparisons.

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330 Wirtschaft

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ISO 690GERSBACH, Hans, Volker HAHN, Stephan IMHOF, 2012. Tax Rules. In: Social Choice and Welfare. 2012, 41(1), pp. 19-42. ISSN 0176-1714. eISSN 1432-217X. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00355-012-0675-1
BibTex
@article{Gersbach2012Rules-24627,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1007/s00355-012-0675-1},
  title={Tax Rules},
  number={1},
  volume={41},
  issn={0176-1714},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  pages={19--42},
  author={Gersbach, Hans and Hahn, Volker and Imhof, Stephan}
}
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