Publikation:

The dynamics of sovereign default risk and political turnover

Vorschaubild

Dateien

Scholl_2-1e4t9iy2j67qj0.PDF
Scholl_2-1e4t9iy2j67qj0.PDFGröße: 235.42 KBDownloads: 79

Datum

2017

Autor:innen

Herausgeber:innen

Kontakt

ISSN der Zeitschrift

Electronic ISSN

ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Schriftenreihe

Auflagebezeichnung

URI (zitierfähiger Link)
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-2-1e4t9iy2j67qj0
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2017.05.002
ArXiv-ID

Internationale Patentnummer

Link zur Lizenz
oops

Angaben zur Forschungsförderung

Projekt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Publikationen
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz

Gesperrt bis

Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published

Erschienen in

Journal of International Economics. 2017, 108, pp. 37-53. ISSN 0022-1996. eISSN 1873-0353. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2017.05.002

Zusammenfassung

This paper develops a stochastic dynamic politico-economic model of sovereign debt to analyze the interaction of sovereign default risk and political turnover. Two parties differ in their preferred size of unproductive public spending which is financed by taxes and external debt. Electoral outcomes are characterized by the economic benefits from the incumbent's policies and stochastic idiosyncratic ideological aspects. Quantitative findings suggest that endogenous political turnover increases the discrepancies between the optimal borrowing and default policies of the two parties. Prior to a debt crisis, the incumbent government accumulates external debt to foster the probability of remaining in power. The dynamic interaction of electoral outcomes, external debt, and sovereign default supports arguments for imposing institutional constraints on incumbent governments.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Sovereign debt, default risk , political turnover, fiscal policy

Konferenz

Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined

Forschungsvorhaben

Organisationseinheiten

Zeitschriftenheft

Zugehörige Datensätze in KOPS

Zitieren

ISO 690SCHOLL, Almuth, 2017. The dynamics of sovereign default risk and political turnover. In: Journal of International Economics. 2017, 108, pp. 37-53. ISSN 0022-1996. eISSN 1873-0353. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2017.05.002
BibTex
@article{Scholl2017dynam-39648,
  year={2017},
  doi={10.1016/j.jinteco.2017.05.002},
  title={The dynamics of sovereign default risk and political turnover},
  volume={108},
  issn={0022-1996},
  journal={Journal of International Economics},
  pages={37--53},
  author={Scholl, Almuth}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/39648">
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper develops a stochastic dynamic politico-economic model of sovereign debt to analyze the interaction of sovereign default risk and political turnover. Two parties differ in their preferred size of unproductive public spending which is financed by taxes and external debt. Electoral outcomes are characterized by the economic benefits from the incumbent's policies and stochastic idiosyncratic ideological aspects. Quantitative findings suggest that endogenous political turnover increases the discrepancies between the optimal borrowing and default policies of the two parties. Prior to a debt crisis, the incumbent government accumulates external debt to foster the probability of remaining in power. The dynamic interaction of electoral outcomes, external debt, and sovereign default supports arguments for imposing institutional constraints on incumbent governments.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2017-07-25T08:39:37Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:issued>2017</dcterms:issued>
    <dcterms:title>The dynamics of sovereign default risk and political turnover</dcterms:title>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/39648/1/Scholl_2-1e4t9iy2j67qj0.PDF"/>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2017-07-25T08:39:37Z</dcterms:available>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dc:contributor>Scholl, Almuth</dc:contributor>
    <dc:creator>Scholl, Almuth</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/39648"/>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/39648/1/Scholl_2-1e4t9iy2j67qj0.PDF"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Interner Vermerk

xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter

Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.

Prüfdatum der URL

Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation

Finanzierungsart

Kommentar zur Publikation

Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen