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Debt Relief for Poor Countries : Conditionality and Effectiveness
dc.contributor.author | Scholl, Almuth | deu |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-02-27T07:34:43Z | deu |
dc.date.available | 2014-02-27T07:34:43Z | deu |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | deu |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies the effectiveness of debt relief to stimulate economic growth in the most heavily indebted poor countries. We develop a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the altruistic donor and the recipient government and model conditionality as an imperfectly enforceable dynamic contract. Our findings suggest that incentive-compatible conditions substantially promote fiscal reform and investment in the short- and long-run. In contrast to the recent practice of fully canceling multilateral debt, optimal debt relief is characterized by a combination of outright grants and subsidized loans. Losing loans as a policy Instrument reduces welfare considerably. | eng |
dc.identifier.ppn | 401720098 | deu |
dc.identifier.uri | http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/26640 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | deu |
dc.legacy.dateIssued | 2014-02-27 | deu |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Paper Series / Department of Economics | deu |
dc.rights | terms-of-use | deu |
dc.rights.uri | https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/ | deu |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | deu |
dc.title | Debt Relief for Poor Countries : Conditionality and Effectiveness | eng |
dc.type | WORKINGPAPER | deu |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
kops.bibliographicInfo.seriesNumber | 2013-23 | deu |
kops.description.openAccess | openaccessgreen | |
kops.flag.knbibliography | true | |
kops.identifier.nbn | urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-266401 | deu |
kops.relation.uniknProjectTitle | Entwicklungshilfe: eine makroökonomische Analyse der Effektivität der Anreizstrukturen | deu |
kops.submitter.email | almuth.scholl@uni-konstanz.de | deu |
temp.submission.doi | ||
temp.submission.source |
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