Debt Relief for Poor Countries : Conditionality and Effectiveness

dc.contributor.authorScholl, Almuthdeu
dc.date.accessioned2014-02-27T07:34:43Zdeu
dc.date.available2014-02-27T07:34:43Zdeu
dc.date.issued2013deu
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the effectiveness of debt relief to stimulate economic growth in the most heavily indebted poor countries. We develop a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the altruistic donor and the recipient government and model conditionality as an imperfectly enforceable dynamic contract. Our findings suggest that incentive-compatible conditions substantially promote fiscal reform and investment in the short- and long-run. In contrast to the recent practice of fully canceling multilateral debt, optimal debt relief is characterized by a combination of outright grants and subsidized loans. Losing loans as a policy Instrument reduces welfare considerably.eng
dc.identifier.ppn401720098deu
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/26640
dc.language.isoengdeu
dc.legacy.dateIssued2014-02-27deu
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper Series / Department of Economicsdeu
dc.rightsterms-of-usedeu
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/deu
dc.subject.ddc330deu
dc.titleDebt Relief for Poor Countries : Conditionality and Effectivenesseng
dc.typeWORKINGPAPERdeu
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.bibliographicInfo.seriesNumber2013-23deu
kops.description.openAccessopenaccessgreen
kops.flag.knbibliographytrue
kops.identifier.nbnurn:nbn:de:bsz:352-266401deu
kops.relation.uniknProjectTitleEntwicklungshilfe: eine makroökonomische Analyse der Effektivität der Anreizstrukturendeu
kops.submitter.emailalmuth.scholl@uni-konstanz.dedeu
temp.submission.doi
temp.submission.source
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2014-02-27 07:34:43
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