Publikation:

Variable Search Intensity in an Economy with Coordination Unemployment

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2008

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IZA Discussion Papers; 3697 (2008)

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Zusammenfassung

This paper analyzes an urn-ball matching model in which workers decide how intensively they sample job openings and apply at a stochastic number of suitable vacancies. Equilibrium is not constrained efficient; entry is excessive and search intensity can be too high or too low. Moreover, an inefficient discouraged-worker effect among homogenous workers emerges under adverse labor market conditions. Unlike existing coordination-friction economies with fixed search intensity, the model can account for the empirical relation between the job-finding rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio, provided that search costs are small and that search intensity is sufficiently procyclical.

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330 Wirtschaft

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matching function, coordination frictions, unemployment

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ISO 690KAAS, Leo, 2008. Variable Search Intensity in an Economy with Coordination Unemployment
BibTex
@techreport{Kaas2008Varia-1816,
  year={2008},
  doi={10.2202/1935-1690.2162},
  series={IZA Discussion Papers},
  title={Variable Search Intensity in an Economy with Coordination Unemployment},
  number={3697 (2008)},
  author={Kaas, Leo}
}
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