Publikation: Variable Search Intensity in an Economy with Coordination Unemployment
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This paper analyzes an urn-ball matching model in which workers decide how intensively they sample job openings and apply at a stochastic number of suitable vacancies. Equilibrium is not constrained efficient; entry is excessive and search intensity can be too high or too low. Moreover, an inefficient discouraged-worker effect among homogenous workers emerges under adverse labor market conditions. Unlike existing coordination-friction economies with fixed search intensity, the model can account for the empirical relation between the job-finding rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio, provided that search costs are small and that search intensity is sufficiently procyclical.
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KAAS, Leo, 2008. Variable Search Intensity in an Economy with Coordination UnemploymentBibTex
@techreport{Kaas2008Varia-1816, year={2008}, doi={10.2202/1935-1690.2162}, series={IZA Discussion Papers}, title={Variable Search Intensity in an Economy with Coordination Unemployment}, number={3697 (2008)}, author={Kaas, Leo} }
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