Publikation: Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments
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2010
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Gächter, Simon
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American Economic Review. 2010, 100(1), pp. 541-556. Available under: doi: 10.1257/aer.100.1.541
Zusammenfassung
One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-world settings. We show that the decline of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for imperfect conditional cooperation. Many people's desire to contribute less than others, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contribute over time or people's heterogeneity in preferences makes voluntary cooperation fragile. Universal free riding thus eventually emerges, despite the fact that most people are not selfish.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
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Public goods experiments, social preferences, conditional cooperation, free riding
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FISCHBACHER, Urs, Simon GÄCHTER, 2010. Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments. In: American Economic Review. 2010, 100(1), pp. 541-556. Available under: doi: 10.1257/aer.100.1.541BibTex
@article{Fischbacher2010Socia-11946,
year={2010},
doi={10.1257/aer.100.1.541},
title={Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments},
number={1},
volume={100},
journal={American Economic Review},
pages={541--556},
author={Fischbacher, Urs and Gächter, Simon}
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