Crises and Responsiveness : Analysing German Preference Formation during the Eurozone Crisis

Abstract

Do crises increase governmental responsiveness to citizens’ policy demands in the European Union? Building on the responsiveness literature, we challenge the claim that well-organized business interests determine governmental preferences in times of crisis. We argue instead, that vote-seeking governments rather account for citizens’ policy demands, given particularly high levels of saliency and public attention prevalent during crises. To test our theory, we analyse the formation of German governmental preferences on Economic and Monetary Union reforms during the Eurozone Crisis. We use novel data from the ‘EMUChoices’ project, public opinion polls as well as newspaper articles and trace the development of the German government’s positioning on reforms such as the new Eurozone bailout fund or the tightening of fiscal governance rules. Our analyses show that the German government, despite intensive lobbying efforts by banks and industry associations, responded rather closely to the demands of the public. On a normative ground, this finding highlights that input legitimacy in European Union decision-making is stronger than oftentimes assumed, at least at the level of governmental preference formation in times of crises.