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No contract or unfair contract : What's better?

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2012

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2012.04.014
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The Journal of Socio-Economics. Elsevier. 2012, 41(4), pp. 384-390. ISSN 1053-5357. eISSN 1879-1239. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2012.04.014

Zusammenfassung

We investigate the welfare implications of unfair incentive contracts in comparison with interactions without contracts. Reciprocal people should cooperate conditionally in the latter situation but punish unfairness by non-cooperation. We confirm that some people do cooperate conditionally in a sequential prisoner's dilemma. Furthermore, some subjects do not cooperate if they face an unfair incentive contract in a similar context. However, there is no correlation between these two types of reciprocity. At an aggregate level, all contracts – no matter how fair they are – improve welfare even if agents are conditionally cooperative.

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330 Wirtschaft

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Contracts, Prisoner's dilemma, Experiment

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ISO 690BRUTTEL, Lisa, Gerald EISENKOPF, 2012. No contract or unfair contract : What's better?. In: The Journal of Socio-Economics. Elsevier. 2012, 41(4), pp. 384-390. ISSN 1053-5357. eISSN 1879-1239. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2012.04.014
BibTex
@article{Bruttel2012-08contr-48581,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1016/j.socec.2012.04.014},
  title={No contract or unfair contract : What's better?},
  number={4},
  volume={41},
  issn={1053-5357},
  journal={The Journal of Socio-Economics},
  pages={384--390},
  author={Bruttel, Lisa and Eisenkopf, Gerald}
}
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