Publikation:

The Logit-Response Dynamics

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50_08_06_TWI_RPS_Alos_Ferrer_Netzer.pdf
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Datum

2008

Autor:innen

Netzer, Nick

Herausgeber:innen

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URI (zitierfähiger Link)
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-59971
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Link zur Lizenz
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.0 Generic

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Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green

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Working Paper/Technical Report
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Published

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Zusammenfassung

We develop a characterization of stochastically stable states for the logit-response learning dynamics in games, with arbitrary specification of revision opportunities. The result allows us to show convergence to the set of Nash equilibria in the class of best-response potential games and the failure of the dynamics to select potential maximizers beyond the class of exact potential games. We also study to which extent equilibrium selection is robust to the specification of revision opportunities. Our techniques can be extended and applied to a wide class of learning dynamics in games.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Learning in games, logit-response dynamics, best-response potential games

Konferenz

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ISO 690ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Nick NETZER, 2008. The Logit-Response Dynamics
BibTex
@techreport{AlosFerrer2008Logit-11952,
  year={2008},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={The Logit-Response Dynamics},
  number={28},
  author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Netzer, Nick}
}
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