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Reconsidering lock-in effects and benefits from delegation : the African Union’s relations with its member states through a principal–agent perspective

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2020

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https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1628707
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Cambridge Review of International Affairs. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 2020, 33(2), pp. 159-178. ISSN 0955-7571. eISSN 1474-449X. Available under: doi: 10.1080/09557571.2019.1628707

Zusammenfassung

This paper explores the relations of the African Union (AU) with its member states through the lens of principal–agent theory. I consider the AU Commission—an international public administration—as an agent to which its member states—the principals—delegate authority. I show that core assumptions of principal–agent theory apply to the AU’s relations with its member states. These include that principals aim to keep control over their agent, that we find agents acting opportunistically, that principals sanction the agent if needed and that the heterogeneity of preferences amongst principals decreases the level of authority delegated to the agent. However, my analysis also suggests that principal–agent theory needs to broaden its understandings of lock-in effects and of the reasons why states limit their delegation of authority.

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ISO 690WELZ, Martin, 2020. Reconsidering lock-in effects and benefits from delegation : the African Union’s relations with its member states through a principal–agent perspective. In: Cambridge Review of International Affairs. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 2020, 33(2), pp. 159-178. ISSN 0955-7571. eISSN 1474-449X. Available under: doi: 10.1080/09557571.2019.1628707
BibTex
@article{Welz2020-03-03Recon-46573,
  year={2020},
  doi={10.1080/09557571.2019.1628707},
  title={Reconsidering lock-in effects and benefits from delegation : the African Union’s relations with its member states through a principal–agent perspective},
  number={2},
  volume={33},
  issn={0955-7571},
  journal={Cambridge Review of International Affairs},
  pages={159--178},
  author={Welz, Martin}
}
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