Publikation: Are people conditionally cooperative? : evidence from a public goods experiment
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2000
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Zürich : Inst. for Empirical Research in Economics
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Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich;16
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Working Paper/Technical Report
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Zusammenfassung
We study the importance of conditional cooperation in a one-shot public goods game by using a variant of the strategy-method. We find that a third of the subjects can be classified as free riders, whereas 50 percent are conditional cooperators.
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Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
voluntary contributions, conditional cooperation, reciprocity, free riding, strategy-method, experiments
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FISCHBACHER, Urs, Simon GÄCHTER, Ernst FEHR, 2000. Are people conditionally cooperative? : evidence from a public goods experiment. Zürich : Inst. for Empirical Research in EconomicsBibTex
@techreport{Fischbacher2000peopl-16665, year={2000}, doi={10.2139/ssrn.203288}, publisher={Zürich : Inst. for Empirical Research in Economics}, series={Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich;16}, title={Are people conditionally cooperative? : evidence from a public goods experiment}, author={Fischbacher, Urs and Gächter, Simon and Fehr, Ernst} }
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