Publikation: The fixed points of belief and knowledge
Dateien
Datum
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Sammlungen
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Publikationsstatus
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung
Self-referential sentences have troubled our understanding of language for centuries. The most famous self-referential sentence is probably the Liar, a sentence that says of itself that it is false. The Liar Paradox has encouraged many philosophers to establish theories of truth that manage to give a proper account of the truth predicate in a formal language. Kripke’s Fixed Point Theory from 1975 is one famous example of such a formal theory of truth that aims at giving a plausible notion of truth by allowing truth value gaps. However, not only the concept of truth gives rise to paradoxes. A syntactical treatment of epistemic notions like belief and knowledge leads to contradictions that very much resemble the Liar Paradox. Therefore, it seems to be fruitful to apply the established theories of truth to epistemic concepts. In this paper, I will present one such attempt of solving the epistemic paradoxes: I adapt Kripke’s Fixed Point Theory and interpret truth, knowledge and belief within the framework of a partial logic. Thereby I find not only the fixed point of truth but also the fixed points of knowledge and belief. In this fixed point, the predicates of truth, belief and knowledge find their definite interpretation and the paradoxes are avoided.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
Zitieren
ISO 690
SCHUSTER, Daniela, 2023. The fixed points of belief and knowledge. In: Logic Journal of the IGPL. Oxford University Press (OUP). ISSN 1367-0751. eISSN 1368-9894. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1093/jigpal/jzad016BibTex
@article{Schuster2023-09-04fixed-70692, year={2023}, doi={10.1093/jigpal/jzad016}, title={The fixed points of belief and knowledge}, issn={1367-0751}, journal={Logic Journal of the IGPL}, author={Schuster, Daniela} }
RDF
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/70692"> <dcterms:abstract>Self-referential sentences have troubled our understanding of language for centuries. The most famous self-referential sentence is probably the Liar, a sentence that says of itself that it is false. The Liar Paradox has encouraged many philosophers to establish theories of truth that manage to give a proper account of the truth predicate in a formal language. Kripke’s Fixed Point Theory from 1975 is one famous example of such a formal theory of truth that aims at giving a plausible notion of truth by allowing truth value gaps. However, not only the concept of truth gives rise to paradoxes. A syntactical treatment of epistemic notions like belief and knowledge leads to contradictions that very much resemble the Liar Paradox. Therefore, it seems to be fruitful to apply the established theories of truth to epistemic concepts. In this paper, I will present one such attempt of solving the epistemic paradoxes: I adapt Kripke’s Fixed Point Theory and interpret truth, knowledge and belief within the framework of a partial logic. Thereby I find not only the fixed point of truth but also the fixed points of knowledge and belief. In this fixed point, the predicates of truth, belief and knowledge find their definite interpretation and the paradoxes are avoided.</dcterms:abstract> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/70692"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/40"/> <dcterms:title>The fixed points of belief and knowledge</dcterms:title> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2024-09-02T09:14:30Z</dc:date> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/> <dc:contributor>Schuster, Daniela</dc:contributor> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2024-09-02T09:14:30Z</dcterms:available> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/40"/> <dcterms:issued>2023-09-04</dcterms:issued> <dc:creator>Schuster, Daniela</dc:creator> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>