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The fixed points of belief and knowledge

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2023

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Logic Journal of the IGPL. Oxford University Press (OUP). ISSN 1367-0751. eISSN 1368-9894. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1093/jigpal/jzad016

Zusammenfassung

Self-referential sentences have troubled our understanding of language for centuries. The most famous self-referential sentence is probably the Liar, a sentence that says of itself that it is false. The Liar Paradox has encouraged many philosophers to establish theories of truth that manage to give a proper account of the truth predicate in a formal language. Kripke’s Fixed Point Theory from 1975 is one famous example of such a formal theory of truth that aims at giving a plausible notion of truth by allowing truth value gaps. However, not only the concept of truth gives rise to paradoxes. A syntactical treatment of epistemic notions like belief and knowledge leads to contradictions that very much resemble the Liar Paradox. Therefore, it seems to be fruitful to apply the established theories of truth to epistemic concepts. In this paper, I will present one such attempt of solving the epistemic paradoxes: I adapt Kripke’s Fixed Point Theory and interpret truth, knowledge and belief within the framework of a partial logic. Thereby I find not only the fixed point of truth but also the fixed points of knowledge and belief. In this fixed point, the predicates of truth, belief and knowledge find their definite interpretation and the paradoxes are avoided.

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Fachgebiet (DDC)
100 Philosophie

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Epistemic paradox, partial logic, predicate treatment, Kripkean approach to belief and knowledge, fixed point theory, self-referential sentences

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ISO 690SCHUSTER, Daniela, 2023. The fixed points of belief and knowledge. In: Logic Journal of the IGPL. Oxford University Press (OUP). ISSN 1367-0751. eISSN 1368-9894. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1093/jigpal/jzad016
BibTex
@article{Schuster2023-09-04fixed-70692,
  year={2023},
  doi={10.1093/jigpal/jzad016},
  title={The fixed points of belief and knowledge},
  issn={1367-0751},
  journal={Logic Journal of the IGPL},
  author={Schuster, Daniela}
}
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