The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices

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2016
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Aghadadashli, Hamid
Wey, Christian
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Economics Letters. Elsevier. 2016, 145(August 2016), pp. 291-294. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.008
Zusammenfassung

We re-examine the Nash bargaining solution when an upstream and downstream firms bargain over a linear input price with unobservable contracts. We show that the profit sharing rule is given by a simple and instructive formula which depends on the parties’ disagreement payoffs, the profit weights in the Nash-product and the elasticity of derived demand. A downstream firm’s profit share increases in the equilibrium derived demand elasticity which in turn depends on the final goods’ demand elasticity.

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330 Wirtschaft
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Vertical relations, Nash bargaining, Demand elasticity
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ISO 690AGHADADASHLI, Hamid, Markus DERTWINKEL-KALT, Christian WEY, 2016. The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices. In: Economics Letters. Elsevier. 2016, 145(August 2016), pp. 291-294. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.008
BibTex
@article{Aghadadashli2016barga-53463,
  year={2016},
  doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.008},
  title={The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices},
  number={August 2016},
  volume={145},
  issn={0165-1765},
  journal={Economics Letters},
  pages={291--294},
  author={Aghadadashli, Hamid and Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus and Wey, Christian}
}
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