Publikation: Trees and Extensive Forms
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2008
Autor:innen
Ritzberger, Klaus
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Journal of Economic Theory. 2008, 143(1), pp. 216-250. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.002
Zusammenfassung
This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying finiteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which all pure strategy combinations induce unique outcomes. The generality of the set-up covers "exotic" cases, like stochastic games or decision problems in continuous time (differential games). We find that the latter class, though a well-defined problem, fails this test.
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Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
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Extensive forms, Trees, Sequential decision theory, Differential games
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ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Klaus RITZBERGER, 2008. Trees and Extensive Forms. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2008, 143(1), pp. 216-250. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.002BibTex
@article{AlosFerrer2008Trees-1859,
year={2008},
doi={10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.002},
title={Trees and Extensive Forms},
number={1},
volume={143},
journal={Journal of Economic Theory},
pages={216--250},
author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Ritzberger, Klaus}
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<dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper addresses the question of what it takes to obtain a well-defined extensive form game. Without relying on simplifying finiteness or discreteness assumptions, we characterize the class of game trees for which all pure strategy combinations induce unique outcomes. The generality of the set-up covers "exotic" cases, like stochastic games or decision problems in continuous time (differential games). We find that the latter class, though a well-defined problem, fails this test.</dcterms:abstract>
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