Publikation:

Tracking and Incentives: A comment on Hanushek and Woessmann

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TWI_Res_22.pdf
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2007

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-42826
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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.0 Generic

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Open Access Green

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Working Paper/Technical Report
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Zusammenfassung

This paper discusses the incentive effect of tracking policies in education. The results contradict the argument by Hanushek and Woessmann (2006), that differences-in-differences estimations capture the full impact of tracking. Such estimations capture the gain in education between the measurements but neglect the gains before the first measurement. In a standard incentive theory framework these gains and their variance differ systematically between tracking and comprehensive systems. In a selective educational system, most students will provide more effort in early education. Signaling considerations enhance this line of argument. As a result, educational tests alone do not reveal the efficiency and distributional aspects of educational policies sufficiently.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Tracking, Selection, Educational Policy, Tracking, Selection

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ISO 690EISENKOPF, Gerald, 2007. Tracking and Incentives: A comment on Hanushek and Woessmann
BibTex
@techreport{Eisenkopf2007Track-11943,
  year={2007},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={Tracking and Incentives: A comment on Hanushek and Woessmann},
  number={22},
  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald}
}
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