Deliberation in the Lab : The Effect of Communication on Information Sharing, Cooperation, and Consensus

Abstract

Does the deliberative quality of communication positively affect the sharing and processing of private information, the rate of cooperation, and the likelihood of consensus decisions? Can such an effect be isolated from personal interests? The face-to-face communication of simulated two-person conflicts in an experimental setting under laboratory control is analysed. Participants are randomly assigned to one of four two-person two-options game-theoretic conflict situations that are embedded in a conflict story. Two symmetric constellations (Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken) and two asymmetric constellations are used. In the asymmetric constellations one actor has a dominant strategy not to cooperate and is therefore at a strategic advantage. The participants discuss the conflict and take a joint decision. The discussion transcripts of 240 observations are used to measure the deliberative quality of the communication between the two participants in four dimensions: justification, equal participation, respect, and accommodation. Automated measures from the VisArgue project are used and combined into an index of deliberative quality of communication.Overall, by comparing a decision that the participants take before they communicate with their joint decision after 30 minutes of negotiation, I can confirm that communication increases the level of cooperation tremendously. This effect is strongest in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, I cannot provide evidence that the deliberative quality overall has a positive effect on either the sharing and processing of information, on the willingness of the participants to cooperate, or on consensual decisions.The individual dimensions provide further insights: A high level of justification of the advantaged actor negatively affects his or her satisfaction value. For the disadvantaged actors, I find higher satisfaction values when they themselves have high values of justification and lower satisfaction values when their experimental partners have high justification values. I also observe that participants in the advantaged position use more arguments, but only if they are male. Equal participation is positively correlated with the sharing of private information. In one asymmetric constellation there is also a positive correlation with the participants’ satisfaction. Respect is negatively correlated with the processing of some information. However, the disadvantaged actors’ respect values are positively correlated with their decision to continue cooperating. Higher levels of accommodation are negatively associated with the sharing and processing of private information and with the advantaged actors’ level of satisfaction. Accommodation is also negatively associated with the one actors’ decisions to cooperate in one symmetric and one asymmetric game-theoretic constellation.Overall, I conclude that the participants had a high predisposition to cooperate in the experiment; however high levels of justification seem to lead to frustration and defection rather than cooperation and consensus. Finally, decisions to cooperate need a certain amount of disagreement at the negotiation stage in order to last.