Publikation: Populist Syndrome and Nonmarket Strategy
Dateien
Datum
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
URI (zitierfähiger Link)
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
Internationale Patentnummer
Link zur Lizenz
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Publikationsstatus
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung
Although recognized as a defining feature of the current political era, populism and its implications for non-market strategy remain undertheorized. We offer a framework that (a) conceptualizes populism and its progression over time; (b) outlines the risks populism generates for firms; and (c) theorizes effective nonmarket strategies under populism. Our framework anchors the political risk profile of populism in three interdependent elements: anti-establishment ideology, de-institutionalization, and short-term policy bias. These elements jointly shape the policymaking dynamics and institutional risks for firms under populism. Our analysis shows how firms can calibrate two nonmarket strategies – political ties and corporate social responsibility – to mitigate populism-related risks. We specify how particular configurations of political ties and CSR activities, aimed at the populist leadership, bureaucrats, political opposition, and societal stakeholders, minimize risk under populism. Further, we theorize how the effectiveness of specific attributes of political ties and CSR – namely their relative covertness (more vs. less concealed) and their relative focus (narrowly vs. widely targeted) – varies as a function of firm type (insiders vs. outsiders) and the probability of populist regime collapse. Finally, we address how motivated reasoning may bias firms' assessments of regime fragility and resulting strategy choices.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
Zitieren
ISO 690
BLAKE, Daniel J., Stanislav MARKUS, Julio MARTINEZ‐SUAREZ, 2024. Populist Syndrome and Nonmarket Strategy. In: Journal of Management Studies. Wiley. 2024, 61(2), S. 525-560. ISSN 0022-2380. eISSN 1467-6486. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1111/joms.12859BibTex
@article{Blake2024Popul-58649, year={2024}, doi={10.1111/joms.12859}, title={Populist Syndrome and Nonmarket Strategy}, number={2}, volume={61}, issn={0022-2380}, journal={Journal of Management Studies}, pages={525--560}, author={Blake, Daniel J. and Markus, Stanislav and Martinez‐Suarez, Julio} }
RDF
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/58649"> <dc:contributor>Martinez‐Suarez, Julio</dc:contributor> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/43613"/> <dc:contributor>Blake, Daniel J.</dc:contributor> <dcterms:abstract>Although recognized as a defining feature of the current political era, populism and its implications for non-market strategy remain undertheorized. We offer a framework that (a) conceptualizes populism and its progression over time; (b) outlines the risks populism generates for firms; and (c) theorizes effective nonmarket strategies under populism. Our framework anchors the political risk profile of populism in three interdependent elements: anti-establishment ideology, de-institutionalization, and short-term policy bias. These elements jointly shape the policymaking dynamics and institutional risks for firms under populism. Our analysis shows how firms can calibrate two nonmarket strategies – political ties and corporate social responsibility – to mitigate populism-related risks. We specify how particular configurations of political ties and CSR activities, aimed at the populist leadership, bureaucrats, political opposition, and societal stakeholders, minimize risk under populism. Further, we theorize how the effectiveness of specific attributes of political ties and CSR – namely their relative covertness (more vs. less concealed) and their relative focus (narrowly vs. widely targeted) – varies as a function of firm type (insiders vs. outsiders) and the probability of populist regime collapse. Finally, we address how motivated reasoning may bias firms' assessments of regime fragility and resulting strategy choices.</dcterms:abstract> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2022-09-19T09:22:06Z</dc:date> <dc:creator>Blake, Daniel J.</dc:creator> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/43613"/> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2022-09-19T09:22:06Z</dcterms:available> <dc:creator>Markus, Stanislav</dc:creator> <dc:rights>Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International</dc:rights> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/58649"/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/58649/1/Blake_2-y6h25qxmg24p7.pdf"/> <dc:contributor>Markus, Stanislav</dc:contributor> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/58649/1/Blake_2-y6h25qxmg24p7.pdf"/> <dcterms:title>Populist Syndrome and Nonmarket Strategy</dcterms:title> <dc:creator>Martinez‐Suarez, Julio</dc:creator> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/> <dcterms:issued>2024</dcterms:issued> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>