Publikation: Infinity in the lab : How do people play repeated games?
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2012
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Kamecke, Ulrich
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Theory and Decision. Springer. 2012, 72(2), pp. 205-219. ISSN 0040-5833. eISSN 1573-7187. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11238-011-9247-6
Zusammenfassung
We introduce a novel mechanism to eliminate endgame effects in repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiments. In the main phase of a supergame our mechanism generates more persistent cooperation than finite horizon or random continuation rules. Moreover, we find evidence for cooperation-enhancing “active/reactive” strategies which concentrate in the initial phase of a supergame as subjects gain experience.
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BRUTTEL, Lisa, Ulrich KAMECKE, 2012. Infinity in the lab : How do people play repeated games?. In: Theory and Decision. Springer. 2012, 72(2), pp. 205-219. ISSN 0040-5833. eISSN 1573-7187. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11238-011-9247-6BibTex
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year={2012},
doi={10.1007/s11238-011-9247-6},
title={Infinity in the lab : How do people play repeated games?},
number={2},
volume={72},
issn={0040-5833},
journal={Theory and Decision},
pages={205--219},
author={Bruttel, Lisa and Kamecke, Ulrich}
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