Publikation: Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up : A Model of Repeated Negotiations
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Game-theoretic analysis of relational contracts typically studies Pareto optimal equilibria. We illustrate how this equilibrium selection rules out very intuitive hold-up concerns in stochastic games with long-term decisions. The key problem is that Pareto optimal equilibria, even if satisfying renegotiation-proofness, do not reflect plausible concerns about how today’s actions affect future bargaining positions within the relationship. We propose and characterize an alternative equilibrium selection based on the notion that continuation play is repeatedly negotiated in a relationship. We illustrate with several examples how the concept naturally combines relational contracting and hold-up concerns.
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GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2023. Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up : A Model of Repeated Negotiations. In: Journal of the European Economic Association. Oxford University Press. 2023, 21(3), pp. 864-906. ISSN 1542-4766. eISSN 1542-4774. Available under: doi: 10.1093/jeea/jvac047BibTex
@article{Goldlucke2023Recon-59005, year={2023}, doi={10.1093/jeea/jvac047}, title={Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up : A Model of Repeated Negotiations}, number={3}, volume={21}, issn={1542-4766}, journal={Journal of the European Economic Association}, pages={864--906}, author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian} }
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