Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up : A Model of Repeated Negotiations

Lade...
Vorschaubild
Dateien
Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.
Datum
2023
Autor:innen
Kranz, Sebastian
Herausgeber:innen
Kontakt
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
URI (zitierfähiger Link)
ArXiv-ID
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Gesperrt bis
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Forschungsvorhaben
Organisationseinheiten
Zeitschriftenheft
Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung

Game-theoretic analysis of relational contracts typically studies Pareto optimal equilibria. We illustrate how this equilibrium selection rules out very intuitive hold-up concerns in stochastic games with long-term decisions. The key problem is that Pareto optimal equilibria, even if satisfying renegotiation-proofness, do not reflect plausible concerns about how today’s actions affect future bargaining positions within the relationship. We propose and characterize an alternative equilibrium selection based on the notion that continuation play is repeatedly negotiated in a relationship. We illustrate with several examples how the concept naturally combines relational contracting and hold-up concerns.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2023. Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up : A Model of Repeated Negotiations. In: Journal of the European Economic Association. Oxford University Press. 2023, 21(3), pp. 864-906. ISSN 1542-4766. eISSN 1542-4774. Available under: doi: 10.1093/jeea/jvac047
BibTex
@article{Goldlucke2023Recon-59005,
  year={2023},
  doi={10.1093/jeea/jvac047},
  title={Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up : A Model of Repeated Negotiations},
  number={3},
  volume={21},
  issn={1542-4766},
  journal={Journal of the European Economic Association},
  pages={864--906},
  author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/59005">
    <dcterms:title>Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up : A Model of Repeated Negotiations</dcterms:title>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:creator>Kranz, Sebastian</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2022-11-03T09:26:20Z</dcterms:available>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2023</dcterms:issued>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Game-theoretic analysis of relational contracts typically studies Pareto optimal equilibria. We illustrate how this equilibrium selection rules out very intuitive hold-up concerns in stochastic games with long-term decisions. The key problem is that Pareto optimal equilibria, even if satisfying renegotiation-proofness, do not reflect plausible concerns about how today’s actions affect future bargaining positions within the relationship. We propose and characterize an alternative equilibrium selection based on the notion that continuation play is repeatedly negotiated in a relationship. We illustrate with several examples how the concept naturally combines relational contracting and hold-up concerns.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dc:contributor>Goldlücke, Susanne</dc:contributor>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2022-11-03T09:26:20Z</dc:date>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:contributor>Kranz, Sebastian</dc:contributor>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/59005"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:creator>Goldlücke, Susanne</dc:creator>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.
Prüfdatum der URL
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Ja
Diese Publikation teilen