Publikation:

How Do Politicians Bargain? : Evidence from Ultimatum Games with Legislators in Five Countries

Lade...
Vorschaubild

Dateien

Sheffer_2-w05ea53n8jin3.pdf
Sheffer_2-w05ea53n8jin3.pdfGröße: 454.88 KBDownloads: 42

Datum

2023

Autor:innen

Sheffer, Lior
Loewen, Peter John
Walgrave, Stefaan
Bailer, Stefanie
Helfer, Luzia
Pilet, Jean-Benoit
Varone, Frédéric
Vliegenthart, Rens

Herausgeber:innen

Kontakt

ISSN der Zeitschrift

Electronic ISSN

ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Schriftenreihe

Auflagebezeichnung

ArXiv-ID

Internationale Patentnummer

Link zur Lizenz

Angaben zur Forschungsförderung

Projekt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Hybrid
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz

Gesperrt bis

Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published

Erschienen in

American Political Science Review. Cambridge University Press. 2023, 117(4), pp. 1429-1447. ISSN 0003-0554. eISSN 1537-5943. Available under: doi: 10.1017/S0003055422001459

Zusammenfassung

Politicians regularly bargain with colleagues and other actors. Bargaining dynamics are central to theories of legislative politics and representative democracy, bearing directly on the substance and success of legislation, policy, and on politicians’ careers. Yet, controlled evidence on how legislators bargain is scarce. Do they apply different strategies when engaging different actors? If so, what are they, and why? To study these questions, we field an ultimatum game bargaining experiment to 1,100 sitting politicians in Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States. We find that politicians exhibit a strong partisan bias when bargaining, a pattern that we document across all of our cases. The size of the partisan bias in bargaining is about double the size when politicians engage citizens than when they face colleagues. We discuss implications for existing models of bargaining and outline future research directions.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
320 Politik

Schlagwörter

Konferenz

Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined

Forschungsvorhaben

Organisationseinheiten

Zeitschriftenheft

Zugehörige Datensätze in KOPS

Zitieren

ISO 690SHEFFER, Lior, Peter John LOEWEN, Stefaan WALGRAVE, Stefanie BAILER, Christian BREUNIG, Luzia HELFER, Jean-Benoit PILET, Frédéric VARONE, Rens VLIEGENTHART, 2023. How Do Politicians Bargain? : Evidence from Ultimatum Games with Legislators in Five Countries. In: American Political Science Review. Cambridge University Press. 2023, 117(4), pp. 1429-1447. ISSN 0003-0554. eISSN 1537-5943. Available under: doi: 10.1017/S0003055422001459
BibTex
@article{Sheffer2023-01-27Polit-60057,
  year={2023},
  doi={10.1017/S0003055422001459},
  title={How Do Politicians Bargain? : Evidence from Ultimatum Games with Legislators in Five Countries},
  number={4},
  volume={117},
  issn={0003-0554},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={1429--1447},
  author={Sheffer, Lior and Loewen, Peter John and Walgrave, Stefaan and Bailer, Stefanie and Breunig, Christian and Helfer, Luzia and Pilet, Jean-Benoit and Varone, Frédéric and Vliegenthart, Rens}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/60057">
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dc:creator>Sheffer, Lior</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2023-02-02T08:46:15Z</dcterms:available>
    <dc:creator>Loewen, Peter John</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Vliegenthart, Rens</dc:creator>
    <dc:contributor>Loewen, Peter John</dc:contributor>
    <dc:contributor>Helfer, Luzia</dc:contributor>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/60057/1/Sheffer_2-w05ea53n8jin3.pdf"/>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/60057/1/Sheffer_2-w05ea53n8jin3.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"/>
    <dc:contributor>Walgrave, Stefaan</dc:contributor>
    <dc:contributor>Bailer, Stefanie</dc:contributor>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2023-02-02T08:46:15Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Breunig, Christian</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Politicians regularly bargain with colleagues and other actors. Bargaining dynamics are central to theories of legislative politics and representative democracy, bearing directly on the substance and success of legislation, policy, and on politicians’ careers. Yet, controlled evidence on how legislators bargain is scarce. Do they apply different strategies when engaging different actors? If so, what are they, and why? To study these questions, we field an ultimatum game bargaining experiment to 1,100 sitting politicians in Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States. We find that politicians exhibit a strong partisan bias when bargaining, a pattern that we document across all of our cases. The size of the partisan bias in bargaining is about double the size when politicians engage citizens than when they face colleagues. We discuss implications for existing models of bargaining and outline future research directions.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dc:creator>Pilet, Jean-Benoit</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Varone, Frédéric</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights>Attribution 4.0 International</dc:rights>
    <dcterms:title>How Do Politicians Bargain? : Evidence from Ultimatum Games with Legislators in Five Countries</dcterms:title>
    <dc:creator>Walgrave, Stefaan</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Bailer, Stefanie</dc:creator>
    <dc:contributor>Vliegenthart, Rens</dc:contributor>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/60057"/>
    <dc:contributor>Breunig, Christian</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:issued>2023-01-27</dcterms:issued>
    <dc:contributor>Sheffer, Lior</dc:contributor>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:creator>Helfer, Luzia</dc:creator>
    <dc:contributor>Pilet, Jean-Benoit</dc:contributor>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dc:contributor>Varone, Frédéric</dc:contributor>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Interner Vermerk

xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter

Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.

Prüfdatum der URL

Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation

Finanzierungsart

Kommentar zur Publikation

Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Ja
Link zu Forschungsdaten
Beschreibung der Forschungsdaten
Research documentation and data
Diese Publikation teilen