Publikation:

Are Forced CEO Turnovers Good or Bad News?

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Datum

2011

Autor:innen

Kind, Axel
Schläpfer, Yves

Herausgeber:innen

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ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Schriftenreihe

WWZ Discussion Paper; 2011/10

Auflagebezeichnung

URI (zitierfähiger Link)
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1679632
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Internationale Patentnummer

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Open Access-Veröffentlichung

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Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Publikationen
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Working Paper/Technical Report
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Published

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Zusammenfassung

To gain insights about the quality of boards' firing decisions, we investigate abnormal stock returns and operating performance around CEO-turnover announcements in a new hand-collected sample of 208 "clean'' turnover events between January 1998 and June 2009. Unlike the majority of previous studies, we show that forced turnovers do not per se represent a positive signal to shareholders. On the contrary, investors seem to critically assess the board's firing decision by considering the quality of the departing manager. When an outperforming CEO is dismissed or forced to leave - an event that occurs in as many as 35% of all dismissals in our sample - shareholders disesteem the board's decision. This finding is confirmed in multivariate cross-sectional regressions, holds for different time subperiods, and is robust to various event-test specifications and proxies of CEO quality.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

CEO turnover, Corporate governance, Firm performance

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ISO 690KIND, Axel, Yves SCHLÄPFER, 2011. Are Forced CEO Turnovers Good or Bad News?
BibTex
@techreport{Kind2011Force-47973,
  year={2011},
  doi={10.2139/ssrn.1679632},
  series={WWZ Discussion Paper},
  title={Are Forced CEO Turnovers Good or Bad News?},
  number={2011/10},
  url={http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123425},
  author={Kind, Axel and Schläpfer, Yves}
}
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Interner Vermerk

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Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/123425

Prüfdatum der URL

2019-12-10

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