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The punishment trap : integration referendums as popularity contests

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Datum

1996

Autor:innen

Weitsman, Patricia A.

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Published

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Comparative Political Studies. 1996, 28(4), pp. 582-607. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0010414096028004004

Zusammenfassung

It is widely believed that voters care little about foreign policy, transforming referendums on international agreements into tests of a government´s popularity. The authors analyze this notion and present two-level games characterized by asymmetric information. The article demonstrates that the linking of domestic issues to an international treaty does not convert referendums into pure plebiscites. However, the two-level decision creates a severe dilemma for the electorate. Uncertainty regarding whether the possible utility of the treaty offsets the value of domestic policies influences the decision of voters. The median voter risks punishing a popular government or failing to express discontent with an unpopular administration. Our games explore the conditions under which competing elites try to manipulate the uncertainty of constituents about the outcome of international negotiations. Empirical illustrations are presented in the form of case studies and survey analyses of the ballots in Denmark, France, Ireland, and Switzerland.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
320 Politik

Schlagwörter

Referenden, Wahlen zweiter Ordnung, Referendums, Game theory, Second order elections

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ISO 690SCHNEIDER, Gerald, Patricia A. WEITSMAN, 1996. The punishment trap : integration referendums as popularity contests. In: Comparative Political Studies. 1996, 28(4), pp. 582-607. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0010414096028004004
BibTex
@article{Schneider1996punis-3841,
  year={1996},
  doi={10.1177/0010414096028004004},
  title={The punishment trap : integration referendums as popularity contests},
  number={4},
  volume={28},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  pages={582--607},
  author={Schneider, Gerald and Weitsman, Patricia A.}
}
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