Publikation: The authoritarian security apparatus : officer careers and the trade-offs in command
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This chapter discusses the fundamental trade-off between competence and loyalty in the authoritarian security apparatus. Research suggests that the survival of autocracies and dictatorships hinges on loyal security officers. However, the management of regime security also requires skills and competence, which officers may use to oust the very regime they pledged to protect. The chapter highlights the importance of command experience as a key ingredient to successful officer careers. It then explains how autocrats use command posts to generate loyalty among competent officers. Employing original data on an entire officer corps, it illustrates the dual logic of officer selection and placement at work in Argentina’s last dictatorship. The regime assigned skilled officers to field positions and co-opted those with uncertain loyalties by placing them close to their home regions. The chapter concludes by highlighting avenues for future research.
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GLÄSSEL, Christian, Belén GONZÁLEZ, Adam SCHARPF, 2024. The authoritarian security apparatus : officer careers and the trade-offs in command. In: LINDSTAEDT, Natasha, Hrsg., Jeroen J.J. VAN DEN BOSCH, Hrsg.. Research Handbook on Authoritarianism. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024, S. 111-126. ISBN 978-1-80220-481-0. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.4337/9781802204827.00014BibTex
@incollection{Glael2024-03-19autho-71772, year={2024}, doi={10.4337/9781802204827.00014}, title={The authoritarian security apparatus : officer careers and the trade-offs in command}, isbn={978-1-80220-481-0}, publisher={Edward Elgar Publishing}, address={Cheltenham, UK}, booktitle={Research Handbook on Authoritarianism}, pages={111--126}, editor={Lindstaedt, Natasha and Van den Bosch, Jeroen J.J.}, author={Gläßel, Christian and González, Belén and Scharpf, Adam} }
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