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Challenging the majority rule in matters of truth

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2014

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https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v7i2.167
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Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics. Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics. 2014, 7(2), pp. 54-72. eISSN 1876-9098. Available under: doi: 10.23941/ejpe.v7i2.167

Zusammenfassung

The majority rule has caught much attention in recent debate about the aggregation of judgments. But its role in finding the truth is limited. A majority of expert judgments is not necessarily authoritative, even if all experts are equally competent, if they make their judgments independently of each other, and if all the judgments are based on the same source of (good) evidence. In this paper I demonstrate this limitation by presenting a simple counterexample and a related general result. I pave the way for this argument by introducing a Bayesian model of evidence and expert judgment in order to give a precise account of the basic problem.

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100 Philosophie

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competence, evidence, social epistemology, testimony, trust in experts, two-expert problem

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ISO 690LAHNO, Bernd, 2014. Challenging the majority rule in matters of truth. In: Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics. Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics. 2014, 7(2), pp. 54-72. eISSN 1876-9098. Available under: doi: 10.23941/ejpe.v7i2.167
BibTex
@article{Lahno2014-12-01Chall-51611,
  year={2014},
  doi={10.23941/ejpe.v7i2.167},
  title={Challenging the majority rule in matters of truth},
  number={2},
  volume={7},
  journal={Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics},
  pages={54--72},
  author={Lahno, Bernd}
}
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