Publikation:

Sick pay provision in experimental labor markets

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Datum

2012

Autor:innen

Oechssler, Jörg
Vadovic, Radovan

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-232064
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.08.002
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Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Publikationen
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European Economic Review. 2012, 56(1), pp. 1-19. ISSN 0014-2921. eISSN 1873-572X. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.08.002

Zusammenfassung

Sick pay is a common provision in most labor contracts. This paper employs an experimental gift exchange environment to explore two related questions using both managers and undergraduates as subjects. First, do workers reciprocate generous sick pay with higher effort? Second, do firms benefit from offering sick pay? Our main finding is that workers do reciprocate generous sick pay with higher effort. However, firms benefit from offering sick pay in terms of profits only if there is competition among firms for workers. Consequently, competition leads to a higher voluntary provision of sick pay relative to a monopsonistic labor market.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Sick pay, Sick leave, Experiment, Gift exchange

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ISO 690DÜRSCH, Peter, Jörg OECHSSLER, Radovan VADOVIC, 2012. Sick pay provision in experimental labor markets. In: European Economic Review. 2012, 56(1), pp. 1-19. ISSN 0014-2921. eISSN 1873-572X. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.08.002
BibTex
@article{Dursch2012provi-23206,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.08.002},
  title={Sick pay provision in experimental labor markets},
  number={1},
  volume={56},
  issn={0014-2921},
  journal={European Economic Review},
  pages={1--19},
  author={Dürsch, Peter and Oechssler, Jörg and Vadovic, Radovan}
}
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