Publikation:

Information Acquisition by Price-Setters and Monetary Policy

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2007

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Working Papers of the Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich;07/73

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Zusammenfassung

In this paper we examine a model where firms decide on the intensity of information acquisition about shocks. We analyze how the monetary policy framework impacts on the aggregate amount of information collected by firms. We show that it is socially beneficial to delegate monetary policy to a conservative central bank even if there are no incentives to push output above its long-run level. Transparency of central banks about economic shocks has ambiguous effects on welfare. If an extreme level of opacity is feasible, it represents the social optimum. Otherwise full transparency may be a second-best solution.

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330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

conservative central banker, optimal monetary policy, information acquisition, Phillips curve, transparency

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ISO 690HAHN, Volker, 2007. Information Acquisition by Price-Setters and Monetary Policy
BibTex
@techreport{Hahn2007Infor-24664,
  year={2007},
  series={Working Papers of the Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich;07/73},
  title={Information Acquisition by Price-Setters and Monetary Policy},
  author={Hahn, Volker},
  note={http://www.cer.ethz.ch/research/wp_07_73.pdf}
}
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http://www.cer.ethz.ch/research/wp_07_73.pdf
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