Publikation:

Undermining lobbying coalitions : the interest group politics of EU copyright reform

Lade...
Vorschaubild

Dateien

Heermann_2-svkqjp4ukfvs1.pdf
Heermann_2-svkqjp4ukfvs1.pdfGröße: 429.24 KBDownloads: ?

Datum

2024

Autor:innen

Herausgeber:innen

Kontakt

ISSN der Zeitschrift

Electronic ISSN

ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Schriftenreihe

Auflagebezeichnung

ArXiv-ID

Internationale Patentnummer

Link zur Lizenz
oops

Angaben zur Forschungsförderung

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG): 390681379
European Union (EU): 822419

Projekt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz

Gesperrt bis

28. Februar 2026

Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published

Erschienen in

Journal of European Public Policy. Taylor & Francis. 2024, 31(8), S. 2287-2315. ISSN 1350-1763. eISSN 1466-4429. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2249948

Zusammenfassung

Recent studies show that, when salience is high, ‘heterogeneous lobbying coalitions’ uniting business and civil society groups are more successful in achieving their lobbying objectives than homogeneous coalitions. It is therefore surprising that a coalition of tech firms and civil society activists failed to prevent the adoption of the EU’s contested 2019 Copyright Directive, which constitutes a significant shift in the Union’s approach to online content regulation. This article argues that proponents of the policy change successfully undermined the lobbying coalition by invoking notions of ‘digital sovereignty’ and by delegitimizing activists as Silicon Valley’s ‘useful idiots’. Combining process-tracing of the lobbying processes and content analysis of European Parliament debates, the article shows how legislators employed delegitimation and sovereignty claims to justify their non-responsiveness to public protests. The article contributes to the interest group literature and debates on ‘digital sovereignty’ by demonstrating its strategic use in the policy-making process.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
320 Politik

Schlagwörter

Digital sovereignty, digital policy, copyright, interest groups, lobbying

Konferenz

Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined

Forschungsvorhaben

Organisationseinheiten

Zeitschriftenheft

Zugehörige Datensätze in KOPS

Zitieren

ISO 690HEERMANN, Max, 2024. Undermining lobbying coalitions : the interest group politics of EU copyright reform. In: Journal of European Public Policy. Taylor & Francis. 2024, 31(8), S. 2287-2315. ISSN 1350-1763. eISSN 1466-4429. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1080/13501763.2023.2249948
BibTex
@article{Heermann2024-08-02Under-67683,
  year={2024},
  doi={10.1080/13501763.2023.2249948},
  title={Undermining lobbying coalitions : the interest group politics of EU copyright reform},
  number={8},
  volume={31},
  issn={1350-1763},
  journal={Journal of European Public Policy},
  pages={2287--2315},
  author={Heermann, Max}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/67683">
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2023-08-28T10:55:45Z</dcterms:available>
    <dcterms:title>Undermining lobbying coalitions : the interest group politics of EU copyright reform</dcterms:title>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2023-08-28T10:55:45Z</dc:date>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/67683"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/43613"/>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/67683/1/Heermann_2-svkqjp4ukfvs1.pdf"/>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:creator>Heermann, Max</dc:creator>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/67683/1/Heermann_2-svkqjp4ukfvs1.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/43613"/>
    <dc:contributor>Heermann, Max</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:abstract>Recent studies show that, when salience is high, ‘heterogeneous lobbying coalitions’ uniting business and civil society groups are more successful in achieving their lobbying objectives than homogeneous coalitions. It is therefore surprising that a coalition of tech firms and civil society activists failed to prevent the adoption of the EU’s contested 2019 Copyright Directive, which constitutes a significant shift in the Union’s approach to online content regulation. This article argues that proponents of the policy change successfully undermined the lobbying coalition by invoking notions of ‘digital sovereignty’ and by delegitimizing activists as Silicon Valley’s ‘useful idiots’. Combining process-tracing of the lobbying processes and content analysis of European Parliament debates, the article shows how legislators employed delegitimation and sovereignty claims to justify their non-responsiveness to public protests. The article contributes to the interest group literature and debates on ‘digital sovereignty’ by demonstrating its strategic use in the policy-making process.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dcterms:issued>2024-08-02</dcterms:issued>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Interner Vermerk

xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter

Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.

Prüfdatum der URL

Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation

Finanzierungsart

Kommentar zur Publikation

Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Ja
Diese Publikation teilen