Publikation: Eliciting preferences for truth-telling in a survey of politicians
Dateien
Datum
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Publikationsstatus
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung
Honesty is one of the most valued traits in politicians. Yet, because lies often remain undiscovered, it is difficult to study if some politicians are more honest than others. This paper examines which individual characteristics are correlated with truth-telling in a controlled setting in a large sample of politicians. We designed and embedded a game that incentivizes lying with a nonmonetary method in a survey answered by 816 Spanish mayors. Mayors were first asked how interested they were in obtaining a detailed report about the survey results, and at the end of the survey, they had to flip a coin to find out whether they would be sent the report. Because the probability of heads is known, we can estimate the proportion of mayors who lied to obtain the report. We find that a large and statistically significant proportion of mayors lied. Mayors that are members of the two major political parties lied significantly more. We further find that women and men were equally likely to lie. Finally, we find a negative relationship between truth-telling and reelection in the next municipal elections, which suggests that dishonesty might help politicians survive in office.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
Zitieren
ISO 690
JANEZIC, Katharina A., Aina GALLEGO, 2020. Eliciting preferences for truth-telling in a survey of politicians. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS). National Academy of Sciences. 2020, 117(36), pp. 22002-22008. ISSN 0027-8424. eISSN 1091-6490. Available under: doi: 10.1073/pnas.2008144117BibTex
@article{Janezic2020Elici-55605,
year={2020},
doi={10.1073/pnas.2008144117},
title={Eliciting preferences for truth-telling in a survey of politicians},
number={36},
volume={117},
issn={0027-8424},
journal={Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS)},
pages={22002--22008},
author={Janezic, Katharina A. and Gallego, Aina}
}RDF
<rdf:RDF
xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" >
<rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/55605">
<dc:creator>Janezic, Katharina A.</dc:creator>
<dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Honesty is one of the most valued traits in politicians. Yet, because lies often remain undiscovered, it is difficult to study if some politicians are more honest than others. This paper examines which individual characteristics are correlated with truth-telling in a controlled setting in a large sample of politicians. We designed and embedded a game that incentivizes lying with a nonmonetary method in a survey answered by 816 Spanish mayors. Mayors were first asked how interested they were in obtaining a detailed report about the survey results, and at the end of the survey, they had to flip a coin to find out whether they would be sent the report. Because the probability of heads is known, we can estimate the proportion of mayors who lied to obtain the report. We find that a large and statistically significant proportion of mayors lied. Mayors that are members of the two major political parties lied significantly more. We further find that women and men were equally likely to lie. Finally, we find a negative relationship between truth-telling and reelection in the next municipal elections, which suggests that dishonesty might help politicians survive in office.</dcterms:abstract>
<foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
<dcterms:title>Eliciting preferences for truth-telling in a survey of politicians</dcterms:title>
<dcterms:issued>2020</dcterms:issued>
<dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
<dc:creator>Gallego, Aina</dc:creator>
<dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2021-11-22T12:41:13Z</dc:date>
<dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
<void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
<dc:contributor>Janezic, Katharina A.</dc:contributor>
<dc:contributor>Gallego, Aina</dc:contributor>
<dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
<dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2021-11-22T12:41:13Z</dcterms:available>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
<bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/55605"/>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
